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ABSTRACT
BOLIVIA’S COCA HEADACHE: THE AGROYUNGAS PROGRAM, INFLATION,
CAMPESINOS, COCA AND CAPITALISM IN BOLIVIA
SEPTEMBER 2010
JOHN D. ROBERTS, B.A., SUNY-ALBANY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jose Angel Hernandez

Bolivia in the 1980s was wracked by monetary inflation approaching levels of the
German Weimar Republic. Immediately following this time of great financial crisis in
Bolivia, the U.N. founded a project through the U.N.D.P. to encourage peasant farmers in
Bolivia to switch from growing coca (the plant used manufacture cocaine) to growing
other cash crops for market. This crop substitution and development program, called the
Agroyungas Project, lasted from 1985 to 1991 and is the focus of this study. While many
U.N. pundits and journalists considered the program’s initial small successes promising,
it has been considered since its conclusion to be a failure. The program was poorly
conceived, poorly funded and poorly executed from the start. So one question remains:
why was the Agroyungas Project a failure? Additionally, was the project simply a way to
steer Bolivians away from the illicit coca/cocaine economy? While on the surface this
might appear to be the case, one must probe the complex situations in Bolivia deeply to
uncover the true missteps behind this U.N. program. By looking at the evidence, it is
apparent that crop substitution programs like the Agroyungas Project failed for a variety
of reasons. Besides poor planning and execution of project plans, the project’s
developers, planners and workers simply did not understand Bolivian indigenous culture
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and Bolivian history. However, the project was not doomed to fail. The lack of
knowledge and understanding of indigenous Bolivian realities, Bolivian geography and
Bolivian history directly led to the failures of the Agroyungas Project.
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INTRODUCTION
“All I had was my coca. I don’t want anyone to take it away from me. If the price goes
up, how will I be able to afford it? Coca kept me going.”
-Luisa, Mama Coca (1991)
“The government wants to bury us alive by starving us. They want to kill us.”
-Magarita Laime, Hell to Pay (1988)

What Has Been Said
The Agroyungas Project entered a Bolivia in 1985 wracked with crippling debt,
severe inflation, rampant joblessness, underdevelopment, and problems associated with
coca growing and cocaine trafficking. While these concerns all posed huge obstacles to
the project’s overall chance for success, the main goal of the project remained clear:
decrease the amount of coca grown in Bolivia for the illicit market. Agroyungas as an
alternative development project hoped to utilize previously successful crop-substitution
formulas, so-called social development, and community incentives to steer Bolivian
campesinos, or rural (primarily indigenous) agrarian peasants away from growing coca.
Theoretically, by reducing the supply of coca flowing to cocaine traffickers, the project
would force the highly adaptable and dynamic cocaine industry to charge higher prices
for cocaine, thereby reducing consumption.1 In addition, alternative development would
act as a wedge, providing the economic stimulus necessary to separate campesinos away
from the narcotraffickers.2
While these predictions were based on perceived logic, they did not come true.
Soon after its conclusion, the Agroyungas Project was deemed a failure by critics and

1

Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pg. 213
2
Ibid., pg. 163
1

pundits alike. Its failure to achieve its main goals of significantly reducing coca growing
in rural Bolivia and alternatively developing coca growing regions of Bolivia offset any
modest successes the project had. Why exactly did the project fail though? Critiques
abounded; many critics such as anthropologists A.L. Spedding and Madeline Barbara
Leons blamed the ineptitude and disorganization of the UN-affiliated groups who
planned and executed the project, (the UNFDAC and the UNDP) as well as project
ignorance regarding the Agroyungas Project’s campesino subjects/participants. Other
critics of the project such as public policymaker/economists Patrick Clawson and
Rensselaer W. Lee III asserted that crop-substitution programs in general only succeeded
in increasing the price of drugs like cocaine, and the crops chosen for such programs did
not have the domestic markets, cheap transportation, and stable world markets required
for sustainable success.3 Still other critics such as political scientist Noam Lupu
proclaimed the Agroyungas Project “doomed” to fail due to a combination of poor
project planning and execution, the relative reliability and profitability of coca, and the
unpredictable world commodities markets. While these analyses all capture parts of the
story, they tend to overcomplicate the failures of the Agroyungas Project and do not
contextualize the project historically. Moreover, by constructing the cause and effect
relationships of the Agroyungas Project in a historical vacuum, critics have mistakenly
portrayed why the project was unsuccessful. This work is an attempt to deepen the
understanding of the Agroyungas Project’s failures. By exploring Bolivian history,
geography, and culture in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as identifying the structural flaws

3

Ibid., pp. 242, 151
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of UN-affiliated programs, then and only then can a more complex and contextualized
understanding of the Agroyungas Project come to light.
What Will Be Said
Examining an alternative development project like the Agroyungas Project in
Bolivia from 1985-1991 requires a deep and rich understanding of the program and the
participants in the program, coca as a commodity grown by peasants in Bolivia, and the
history of Bolivia. A balanced appraisal of the Agroyungas Project is only possible by
circumscribing the Agroyungas Project inside its preceding and surrounding
circumstances, thereby contextualizing what happened before, during, and after the
project.
The Agroyungas Project conducted by the UNDP and UNFDAC in Bolivia from
1985-1991 was not “destined to fail” as many critics of the program have stated.4 The
project neglected most of the “on the ground” conditions and prior histories of crop
substitution, eradication, and coca in Bolivia. Greater clarity regarding the Agroyungas
Project can only be gained by investigating what was happening in Bolivia prior to the
project, as well as fully interrogating the lives of rural Bolivian coca growers.
Thematically, the chapters of this work are broken down into four parts. Chapters 1, 2,
and 3 focus on problems and concerns surrounding the project that occurred before the
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For examples of critics stating that the Agroyungas Project was “destined to
fail,” please review The World of Coca Campaign’s “The Failure of Good Intentions:
The United Nations in the War Against Drugs,” Narcotics and Development Discussion
Paper No. 5 (London, UK: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993), Noam
Lupu’s “Towards a New Articulation of Alternative Development: Lessons From Coca
Supply Reduction in Bolivia,” Development Policy Review 22 (July 2004): pp. 405-421,
and Dominic Streatfeild’s Cocaine: An Unauthorised Biography (London, UK: Virgin
Publishing Ltd, 2001).
3

Agroyungas Project took place, and Chapter 4 examines what actually happened during
the Agroyungas Project and its eventual results.
Chapter 1 concentrates on early efforts in the 1970s to substitute or eradicate
coca, the lives and culture of rural Indian coca growers in Bolivia in the 1980s, and the
effects eradication programs in the 1980s had on Bolivia and Bolivian campesinos. By
examining these individual concerns, the obstacles to the Agroyungas Project’s success
become apparent, and the Project’s eventual failure becomes not “predestined” per se, but
was instead due to the lack of ad hoc planning by the UNDP and UNFDAC based on the
Bolivian economic, social and political realities of the 1970s and 1980s.
In Bolivia in the 1980s, many of the country’s long term problems that stemmed
from coca growing and campesinos were exacerbated by newer problems. Coups,
corruption, drought, and unimaginable inflation levels of the Bolivian peso created a
situation of incredible economic instability leading up to the Agroyungas Project starting
in 1985. Chapter 2 deals specifically with many of the less than favorable economic,
environmental, political, and social conditions leading up to the UNDP’s crop
substitution program in Bolivia. By exploring in depth the military coup spearheaded by
Luis Garcia Meza Tejada and his administration, the effects of inflation on Bolivia, the
drought in western Bolivia from 1982-1985, and the public sector structural adjustment
program that laid off tens of thousands of tin miners in Bolivia, it becomes clearer that a
country like Bolivia was fairly unique in its multiplicity of simultaneous economic
misfortunes. In a country deemed “the land of believe it or not,” any attempts to
substitute coca for other crops would require taking into consideration the long and
hellish economic rollercoaster ride that took place in Bolivia right before the Agroyungas

4

Project started in 1985.5 Formulaic programs would never work in Bolivia because they
did not take into account all of the preceding events that affected the Yungas region
leading up to the year 1985.
Chapter 3 investigates the structural flaws of UN-affiliated programs and the
unique conditions and characteristics of Bolivia, as well as some of the notable effects
coca growing had on the country and the world. By demonstrating the important effects
UN policy had on its affiliated programs and how they conducted projects, the
ramifications those structural flaws had on the Agroyungas Project will be exposed. Also,
by scrutinizing the social conditions, people, agriculture and infrastructure of Bolivia, the
extreme difficulties that the Agroyungas Project faced will be unveiled.
These difficulties were omnipresent as the Agroyungas Project stepped into a
tempestuous financial, social, and cultural milieu beginning in 1985. Despite these
daunting obstacles, this crop-substitution project was not predestined to fail. This cropsubstitution project failed because project officials did not properly consider the unique
economic, cultural, social, ecological, and historical circumstances surrounding Bolivian
peasant growers in the Yungas region of Bolivia in the 1980s. Additionally, project
planners committed catastrophic blunders when they predicted the future trends for the
Bolivian and international markets, stumbled to adapt to unforeseen events and problems,
consistently faltered in their efforts to properly implement and execute their plans, and
failed to properly see the project through to its appropriate endpoint, i.e. a modicum of
sustainable alternative development in the target coca-growing regions of Bolivia.
Chapter 4 attempts to demonstrate that the historical events in Bolivia leading up to the
5

Lydia Chavez, “Unfortunate Bolivia, The Land of Believe It or Not,” New York
Times, Jul. 31, 1985, pg. A2
5

project, Bolivia’s lack of infrastructure, Bolivian peasant culture, and the myopic,
formulaic, inflexible, and inadaptable nature of the planners in charge of the Agroyungas
Project all converged to create a “perfect storm” of problems for the project, leading to its
eventual failure.

6

CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE STAGE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT FAILURE:
PART I
1.1 Early Crop Substitution, Eradication, and Coca in Bolivia in the 1970s
With the resurgence of cocaine consumption in the United States and Europe in
the early 1970s, illicit coca growing increased exponentially. Rural Bolivians in the
1970s were primarily subsistence agriculturalists, growing oranges, potatoes, corn to eat,
and coca to consume or to sell. They purchased things for themselves that were not able
to be grown or made in rural Bolivia such as “rice, salt, cooking oil, [and] sugar.”6 Coca
was grown for chewing and for processing into cocaine in the Yungas region and
Cochabamba Province in the early 1970s.7
It was estimated that “as much as one-third of Bolivia’s official coca output of
4,200 metric tons” per year was finding its way into cocaine trafficker hands as of 1972.8
This uptick was spurred on by a dramatic rise in cocaine consumption abroad, where
cocaine seizures in consumer countries such as the United States saw an increase of 700
percent from 1969 to 1975.9 From 1973 to 1975, coca leaf prices “soared 1500 percent
from $4 to $60 a bale” in Bolivia.10 Cocaine in the 1970s was “less expensive than
heroin,” and considered to be “not physically addictive.” It was also thought to be a
“sexual stimulant.”11
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Juan de Onis, “Cocaine a Way of Life For Many In Bolivia,” New York Times,
Feb. 22, 1972, pg. 2
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Nicholas Gage, “Latins Now Leaders of Hard-Drug Trade,” New York Times,
Apr. 21, 1975, pg. 1
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
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As of 1973, it was estimated by Raymond P. Shafer, chairman of the U.S.
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse that “about 90 percent of the
world’s cocaine comes from the Andes Mountains-Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador-where it is
legally grown, and there is nothing we can do about it-except crop substitution in the long
run.”12 The negativity expressed in Shafer’s statement towards Andean law and crop
substitution as the only available strategy to combat coca growing internationally is
palpable. Some U.S. officials would obviously have preferred a ban on all coca growing
around the world to make their drug interdiction activities more simplified.
Coca cultivation was legal in Bolivia throughout the 1970s. Despite this, laws
were enacted in Bolivia in 1974 under the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer Suarez to control
coca production and encourage crackdowns on drug dealers and cocaine traffickers.
While these laws were put into Bolivian code, Bolivia was slow to implement them. 13
Despite this slowness, the United States viewed Banzer as a relatively willing and
cooperative partner in the fight against coca and cocaine in Bolivia.14
Even with a sympathetic Hugo Banzer Suarez running Bolivia, problems with
coca and cocaine enforcement continued. Bolivian police routinely had to rely on Interpol
and police forces from neighboring countries for drug enforcement assistance due to
Bolivia’s “limited resources.”15 Drug traffickers in Bolivia regularly bribed officials of all
kinds, including officials in the police, the judiciary, and government.16 To compound
this problem even further, corruption, intimidation, an “inability to keep important figures
12

Marvine Howe, “Drug Panel, Concluding a 6-Nation Tour, Calls For a SteppedUp Drive,” New York Times, Jan. 14, 1973, pg. 47
13
Gage, “Latins Now Leaders of Hard-Drug Trade.”
14
De Onis, “Cocaine a Way of Life For Many In Bolivia.”
15
“Bolivia Uncovers Drug Factories,” New York Times, Sept. 10, 1972, pg. 24
16
Gage, “Latins Now Leaders of Hard-Drug Trade.”
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in jail,” “a lack of conspiracy statutes,” and a dearth of extradition treaties between Latin
America and the United States plagued the coca and cocaine trafficking interdiction plans
consumer countries like the U.S. wanted so badly to enact.17 If the problems with drug
enforcement were not enough for Bolivia itself, in 1976, the United States worsened their
own situation by closing their regional Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) office in
Caracas, Venezuela, thereby ending any permanent visible or physical drug enforcement
presence in Latin America.18
Distribution networks for cocaine trafficking out of Bolivia in the 1970s were
quite intricate. In the early 1970s, the Chilean port of Arica was the main hub for refining
and shipping cocaine to the United States.19 Allegedly, Chile had some of “the best
cocaine chemists in South America.”20 Chile’s role in cocaine trafficking abroad ended
with the military junta led by Augusto Pinochet in 1973. Following his overthrow of
Salvador Allende, Pinochet systematically cracked down on cocaine chemists and
traffickers, either jailing, killing, or expelling them from Chile soon after he came to
power.21 Inside Bolivia, the primary centers of cocaine trafficking were La Paz in the
west and Santa Cruz in the east.22
Besides shipping cocaine paste to Chile until approximately 1973, the other routes
of cocaine paste distribution out of Bolivia were “from Santa Cruz to northern Paraguay
and western Brazil” or to Argentina to be processed into cocaine and smuggled to
17

David Vidal, “The U.S. Is Both Chief Consumer and Principal Worrier,” New
York Times, Mar. 19, 1978, pg. E2
18
Robert Pear, “Drug Agency Plays Hard, But Does It Play Smart?” New York
Times, Aug. 24, 1980, pg. E4
19
De Onis, “Cocaine a Way of Life For Many In Bolivia.”
20
Gage, “Latins Now Leaders of Hard-Drug Trade.”
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
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consumer markets in the U.S. and Europe.23 With the meteoric rise of Colombian drug
trafficking in the late 1970s, these cumbersome southerly-oriented routes for getting
cocaine paste out of Bolivia were abandoned for small plane flights from Bolivia to
Colombia. In the late 1970s and 1980s, cocaine paste processing and trafficking by elites
in the northern Beni Province of Bolivia grew, allowing shipments of cocaine paste from
the Beni to then get transported and refined in Colombia and onward to the United
States.24
The significance of the evolution of trafficking routes to the United States and
Europe in the 1970s cannot be underestimated. While the D.E.A. removed its last
regional bastion from South America in 1976, cocaine trafficking routes were constantly
evolving to suit shifting intermediary destinations, increasing technological sophistication
and to a new cast of middlemen. A lack of physical presence in South America by the
D.E.A. put the United States at a severe disadvantage when narcotrafficking networks,
people, techniques, technology and routes were evolving at an extremely rapid pace in
the Andean region.
Ironically, abandoning the last D.E.A. regional base in Caracas, Venezuela
coincided with a strategy shift in the fight against cocaine in the U.S. United States
cocaine interdiction strategy had progressed over time “from customs control at the
border, to attempts to break the smuggling link at the transportation and processing level
overseas,” to eliminating coca as a crop, be it by eradication or by crop substitution.25

23

Ibid.
Kevin Healy, “The Cocaine Industry in Bolivia-Its Impact on the Peasantry,”
Cultural Survival Quarterly, Dec. 31, 1985, pg. 24
25
Juan de Onis, “Drug Traffic Turns Colombian Coast Into Zone of Terror,” New
York Times, Oct. 25, 1976, pg. 2
24
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By 1976, the United States was working closely with Hugo Banzer Suarez on a
crop substitution project that would “replace coca leaves as a cash crop for the poor
peasants” of Bolivia. The program cost $25 million, and if successful, was slated to be
tested in Peru afterwards.26 This project was a pilot project, and focused on substituting
coffee and citrus fruits for coca crops.27 If the pilot project was successful, (it was not)
more funding and support would come from the United States starting in fiscal year 1979,
with Bolivia contributing 25 percent of the costs of the project.28 Banzer was allegedly
committed to the project, suggesting a combination of crop substitution and narcotics
control support in Bolivia to achieve optimal success.29 USAID, the government agency
overseeing the pilot project in Bolivia in conjunction with the Bolivian government and
with funds put forth by the International Narcotics Control Program even planned to
conduct a “multidisciplinary study…to determine what types of social problems may be
involved in a crop substitution program.”30
The USAID memorandum outlining these joint plans with Bolivia for crop
substitution was not completely optimistic though. While the author Sheldon B. Vance,
Senior Advisor for Narcotics Control in the U.S. State Department expressed
ambivalence and uncertainty regarding the success or failure of the pilot project for crop
substitution in Bolivia, he did not mince words in stating that Bolivian narcotics control
lacked the “technical competence” and would require “major reorganization…to achieve

26

Ibid.
U.S. Department of State, Memorandum For Honorable James T. Lynn,
Director, Office of Management and Budget (Washington, DC: USAID, Jun. 29, 1976),
pg. 1
28
Ibid., pg. 2
29
Ibid., pg. 1
30
Ibid.
27
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the desired results of identifying and prosecuting traffickers.”31 American patience and
tolerance for crop substitution programs involving the replacement of coca appeared
minimal beginning from the statements of Raymond P. Shafer up to this point in 1976
and beyond, and with the ouster of Hugo Banzer Suarez in 1978, the instability of the
Bolivian state made crop substitution programs difficult to actuate in a joint U.S.Bolivian partnership. Additionally, official State Department statements such as these,
which demonstrated a lack of faith in Bolivian narcotics control, could be considered the
beginnings of direct U.S. military and police involvement in coca eradication in Bolivia
starting in the 1980s. Meanwhile, in the 1970s, the problem of illicit coca growing in
Bolivia continued to grow significantly. The estimate of 4200 metric tons of coca, onethird of which was grown for the illicit market per year in Bolivia for 1972 had by 1978
risen to production levels of approximately “30,000 to 35,000 metric tons a year, of
which 80 percent [went] to the illicit market.”32
Bolivia in the 1970s was a burgeoning coca grower. As the worldwide consumer
demand for cocaine increased, so followed Bolivian coca production. The United States’
lack of faith in crop substitution programs to reduce coca production was affirmed, not in
the failure of the pilot project to reduce coca growing itself, but more in the instability of
the Bolivian state following the overthrow of Banzer in 1978. Successful investments of
millions of dollars abroad in crop substitution by the United States were dependent upon
the economic and political stability of places like Bolivia, as well as the engagement level
and trust of the affected people in their state, and the willingness of coca growers to
participate the crop substitution program instituted.
31
32

Ibid., pg. 3
Vidal, “The U.S. Is Both Chief Consumer and Principal Worrier.”
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The hesitancy of the United States to believe and invest in crop substitution in
Bolivia was essentially due to a lack of confidence in the Bolivian state, not necessarily
in crop substitution as a program itself. U.S. reliance on coca eradication (though in the
end also relatively ineffective) was direct involvement and only required the use of force,
supplies, equipment, and the training of Bolivian military and police forces. Interestingly
though, just as the U.S. had little confidence in the Bolivian state and therefore little faith
in successful crop substitution programs, so too was the same sentiment shared by rural
Bolivian coca growers.
1.2 The Rural Bolivian Peasantry
The Indian peasantry of Bolivia has traditionally not believed in, trusted, or
engaged in the state-making activities conducted by Bolivia both before and after the
Land Reform Revolution of 1952. This disengagement from the Bolivian state by the
Indian peasantry was seen by Bolivian officials and diplomats to Bolivia as a survival
strategy and coping mechanism to safeguard against the instability of Bolivia as a nationstate.33 Indian disengagement from the Bolivian state was also viewed as an obstacle to
“national unity and surefooted progress.”34 While this theory was probably accurate,
whose vision of the Bolivian nation was considered the vision? Dissonant visions of how
Bolivia should operate as a nation-state abounded. This section analyzes the Agroyungas
Project’s efficacy and results by examining the history, lives, and culture of rural Indian
peasants in Bolivia and how their prior interactions with the Bolivian state shaped their
participation, decision-making, trust, and actions in the UNDP’s crop-substitution
project.
33
34

Chavez, “Unfortunate Bolivia, The Land of Believe It or Not.”
Ibid.
13

As of 1985, 80 percent of Bolivia’s population was Indian, (5 million people)35
and of that population, 60 percent were rural.36 Representation of Indians in the Bolivian
National Assembly was limited to virtually nonexistent during the 1980s, and any
semblance of a state sanctioned radical Indian agenda seeking Indian rights and goals was
eliminated.37 Five million people (a majority of the Bolivian population) lacked a say in
the Bolivian state. The Bolivian government was seen as a destabilizing agent in Indian
affairs; its goal was to destabilize indigenous communities and incorporate them into the
capitalist vision of the Bolivian state.38
Indigenous disaffection with the Bolivian state bred an expectation of poverty.39
Rural backwater and highland towns in Bolivia possessed little infrastructure,
experienced little development, and had few prospects.40 Rural peasants lived primarily
in mud brick houses, houses which rarely had any access whatsoever to electricity.41
Rural Indian communities retained their tribal structure, bartered for some goods, and
generally ate what they grew.42 Bolivian peasants since the Land Reform Revolution of
1952 primarily owned smallholdings, which were too small for mechanized farming
methods to be profitable.43 Smallholdings in Bolivia accounted for much of the food
production in the country, yet received no subsidies from the Bolivian government and
35

Doug George, “5 Million Indians Without Status in Bolivia,” Akwesasne Notes
18 (Mar. 31, 1986): pg. 12
36
Chavez, “Unfortunate Bolivia, The Land of Believe It or Not.””
37
George, pg. 12
38
Ibid.
39
Joel Brinkley, “Bolivian Town Resents Drug Glare,” New York Times, Jul. 25,
1986, pg. A2
40
Ibid.
41
Tim Johnson, “Coping With Austerity in Highland Bolivia,” Cultural Survival
Quarterly, Sept. 30, 1986, pg. 12
42
Chavez, “Unfortunate Bolivia, The Land of Believe It or Not.”
43
Johnson, pg. 12
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did not receive the approval or support of the Bolivian National Council for Agrarian
Reform.44 Not only did the Bolivian government invest mainly in commercial farming
that produced crops like sugar cane and cotton, but the flood of U.S. food aid and
imported goods into Bolivia devastated rural Bolivian agricultural competitiveness as
well. Traditional food crops had to compete with imported foods in an already saturated
market. Rural Indians became increasingly dependent on the markets for selling their
excess food products and trucking their marketable crops to market, all to their own
detriment.45 Rural Indian communities in Bolivia increasingly lost their self sufficiency
through their increasing integration into the market economy, an economy which they
would never be able to adequately compete in due to their rugged living conditions and
limited productive capacities.46
While the outside capitalist market and the Bolivian state pushed rural Indian
peasants into the market economy, the traditional ayllu was a way to maintain
separateness from the state and retain Indian identity. Ayllus are complex community
systems that “continue[d] to regulate social, economic and political life among Andean
peoples,” including rural Bolivian campesinos.47 Ayllus consisting of between twenty to
fifty families in a community attempt to help each other and eliminate social conflict
through collective organization.48 They also conflict with the Bolivian state because they
are not circumscribed by capitalist ideology. Instead of exploiting the land to the fullest,

44
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rural Indians in Bolivia seek equilibrium with the land, thereby lacking the ideological
framework of capitalism.49 Those Indians who have sought work in cities are supported
by food and assistance from their respective ayllu in the countryside.50 Extended kinship
networks and complicated systems of food and supplies exchange between scattered and
diverse landholdings of the ayllu make this Indian community conceptualization a
formidable opponent to capitalist expansion in rural Bolivia, and presents challenges to
understanding and recognition from the Bolivian nation-state.51 While capitalism in the
1980s coerced rural Indians to join the market economy, the pre-Colombian ayllu system
maintained its autonomy to a certain extent, and struggled in the face of Bolivian aims to
incorporate Indians into the state on Bolivian terms. Campesino disengagement from the
Bolivian state not only was a survival strategy for rural Indians protecting themselves
against state instability, but was also a structural consequence of the unique non-capitalist
ayllu system. Consequently, these regions where ayllus dominated were a mental and
literal stumbling block to fully commoditizing Bolivian lands and complete incorporation
into the world market economy.
Bolivian peasant campesino families were also completely engulfed in coca
growing as a total peasant household tradition. Daily life in the Yungas region of Bolivia
(and to a lesser extent the Chapare area) “revolve[d] around the coca field.” All of the
family worked together in the growing and harvesting of coca.52 Peasant couples planted
coca in the first years of their marriage, with the plant coming “into full production
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(when) their children are six to eight years old. (These children) can help them (with
cultivating coca), and the fields go on producing until children have families of their
own.”53 Abandoning or eradicating coca growing in these areas would be a rejection of
traditional family life, as well as a rejection of cultural identity and that which “signifies
(Bolivian) Indianness.” Additionally, “the debate is not (just) coca itself, but the cultural
separateness of the people who chew it.”54 Rural campesinos were not just separated from
the culture of the state by growing coca, but also by chewing it. For these reasons, one
can consider coca a “total social fact” of indigenous Bolivian peasant smallholders; a
nearly indispensable social reality that is ubiquitous.55
Coca’s place in the traditional rural Indian reality was indisputable. Coca is
associated with many Indian rituals, promotes social interaction, and allows chewers to
commune better with nature. Additionally, coca has medicinal and nutritional value.56 In
rural Bolivia, coca is used by mothers of families along with other indigenous plants to
treat illness. The mother is the primary health care provider, as well as a family’s record
keeper in traditional Indian societies in Bolivia.57 In addition to the campesino mother
providing health care, the yatiri, or community healer, also uses coca leaves to heal the
sick and for augury.58 A majority of medical treatments of any kind were too expensive
for rural Indians in Bolivia in the 1980s, requiring a reliance on traditional herbalist
53
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medicine. 59 Coca was an accessible stimulant and an adequate palliative for campesinos.
Their coca consumption helped increase blood flow and heart rates to ease pain in
afflicted areas and helped to combat the aches and pains as well as the lack of energy
brought on by altitude sickness. In an area where pain relievers like aspirin are a luxury, a
stimulant like coca provides an excellent medicinal stopgap solution.
While modern innovations like medications were expensive and elusive for rural
Indians in Bolivia in the 1980s, other modern “necessities” were just as absent. As
previously mentioned, electricity was a rarity in rural Bolivia in the 1980s. Another
important modern amenity that was absent from rural Bolivia was the telephone. As of
1983, 2.5 billion people, or 55 percent of the Earth’s population had no
telecommunications of any kind. This statistic undoubtedly included a large portion of
Bolivia’s rural communities as of 1983. Just as access to any telecommunications was
limited in rural Bolivia in 1983, so was its efficacy and quality limited. In 1983, a phone
call from Bolivia to Paraguay had to be routed through New York City to be connected.60
The monopolization of telecommunications by the “First World” inhibited the growth of
domestic telecommunications in the “Third World.”61 More importantly for Bolivian
peasants though was what the telephone could have given ayllus and political
movements. Telecommunications “give a voice to an entirely new constituency and allow
them to make greater demands on central governments.”62 Moreover,
telecommunications enable distant peoples and communities to foster greater connections
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in business, social relations, and information sharing in emergency situations. The
Bolivian state, whether purposefully or not, left rural Indian populations disconnected
from the state, and disconnected from each other.
The Bolivian state has a record for keeping Indians outside of state-making
activities. Indians were not allowed to learn how to read until the Land Reform
Revolution of 1952.63 Also, Indians even in the 1980s were discriminated against in
regards to military service. Indians or men with “Indian facial features” were not allowed
to attend military school in Bolivia.64 One of the easiest ways for a rural Indian with a
lack of formal education to gain status in a country like Bolivia would have been to join
the military. By barring that option to Bolivian Indians, the state’s ruling white and
mestizo elites disabled a common method globally for poor or disadvantaged citizens to
climb the social ladder. Banning Indians from the military would also theoretically lead
to Indians in Bolivia mistrusting the military on the simple grounds of their exclusionary
practices. Indians in Bolivia also believed that the European and mestizo portions of the
Bolivian state often resolved their differences and united to repress the Indians
(particularly the rural Indians) to further state goals and secure state activities.65
Police and military coca eradication operations not only angered rural Indian coca
growers by stripping them of a valuable agricultural and cultural investment, but it also
fed into the mistrust of the state, the military and the police by rural Indians. Accounts of
resistance, deaths, and rapes resulting from eradication operations in rural coca growing
Bolivia abounded. In 1983, a massacre allegedly occurred in Chulumani, Bolivia (the
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Yungas region) by “Bolivian security forces…making a narcotics raid.”66 Incidents like
this followed a general agreement in 1982 between the United States and Bolivia “on a
plan for the eradication of coca…beyond normal production.”67 Farmer and military
protests against the “U.S.-trained antidrug squad nicknamed the Leopards” operating in
the Chapare region of Bolivia, along with farmer unions in the area setting up roadblocks
eventually led to their withdrawal in 1985 after one year of operations.68
By 1986, the Leopards were back in the Chapare and were accused of raping a
woman. 17,000 peasant coca farmers surrounded the Leopards base camp and placed
them under siege, not only for the accusations of rape, but also as an indictment against
their police actions in the Chapare.69 Strikes and protests accompanied the presence of
U.S. troops in Bolivia training soldiers and police forces on how to conduct eradication
operations, the cessation of which was only achieved by U.S. forces leaving in November
of 1986.70 Following the 60-day “Operation Blast Furnace” of 1986, which delivered
troops and helicopters to Bolivia to train military and police on anti-drug operations
targeting labs and traffickers, protests, strikes and roadblocks against coca eradication
operations continued into the next year to prevent Americans from returning to Bolivia in
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any capacity. 71 As the Bolivian ambassador to the U.S. Fernando Illanes stated in 1986,
attacking a large interest group of any kind creates political and economic problems.72 By
1985, the first year of the Agroyungas Project in Bolivia, eradication efforts soured
peasants towards the idea of crop-substitution programs involving coca.73 Crop
substitution was viewed as equivalent to prior eradication efforts, and both were deemed
by campesinos as an assault on indigenous culture, values and society.
Eradication efforts even soured the military. As of 1984 onwards, complaints in
the military grew louder, (an exclusionary element of the Bolivian state that was antiIndian) with claims that “drug enforcement was a police matter and was harming the
army’s image.”74 By the beginning of the Agroyungas Project in 1985, Bolivian and U.S.
fears of “inflam[ing]… peasant radicalism” over coca eradication actions in rural Bolivia
were realized.75 Allowing the U.S. to challenge Bolivian sovereignty, as well as the
exclusionary Bolivian military and corrupt Bolivian police operating in rural coca
growing regions of Bolivia led to campesino mistrust, disillusionment, and virulent
hatred of any state involvement in anything related to anti-coca operations in the coca
growing regions of Bolivia. It was into this milieu and setting that the UNDP, UNFDAC,
and the Agroyungas Project stepped into Bolivia with their crop-substitution program in
1985.
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1.3 Conclusion
The instability of the Bolivian state created a situation where neither the United
States nor the rural Indian coca growers of Bolivia had faith in the state. While this meant
that Bolivian campesinos stayed disengaged from Bolivian state-making activities, the
Bolivian elite rarely engaged rural Indian communities, and when they did so, only
pursued their own state agendas and under their own terms. The Bolivian state’s
exclusionary tactics further alienated the rural coca growing communities, building
mistrust and enmity between both parties involved.
Moreover, the United States was hesitant to invest in Bolivian crop-substitution
programs because it required a long-term investment in a stable country, a bargain in
which Bolivia could not uphold. The United States’ lack of presence in South America
coincided with the evolution of a mature cocaine trade and the explosion of cocaine’s
popularity globally. A world superpower like the United States underestimated and
ignored a global drug phenomenon, and attempted to ameliorate their initial failures by
direct training and supplying of eradication programs, which ended in the exacerbation of
enmity amongst the Bolivian coca growing peasantry against any state action of any kind.
When the Agroyungas Project kicked off in 1985, so much negativity had been created in
Bolivia by preceding events that success required tailor-made long-term campesinooriented strategies and planning, none of which the UNDP or the UNFDAC was willing
or able to institute.
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CHAPTER 2
SETTING THE STAGE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT FAILURE:
PART II
2.1 Military Coup of 1980 and Its Corruption
On July 17th 1980, General Luis Garcia Meza Tejada took control of Bolivia in a
military coup.76 He wrested control of Bolivia from the “civilian caretaker government of
Lydia Gueiler Tejada,” a relative of Garcia Meza’s.77 The coup also disallowed the
rightly elected Hernan Siles Zuazo from entering office on August 6th of 1980.78 Garcia
Meza’s rule lasted just over a year when he was forced to resign in August 4th 1981, but
the brevity of Garcia Meza’s presidency does not diminish its importance in Bolivian
history or the amount of corruption, violence and deception committed by Garcia Meza’s
regime.79 The military coup of Garcia Meza was also called the “cocaine coup” by many
foreign analysts.80 Bolivia’s most important cocaine trafficker, Roberto Suarez,
reportedly funded Garcia Meza’s coup, “usher[ing] in an era of corruption and drug
dealing at the highest government levels.”81 These nefarious governmental dealings led
the U.S. to take unprecedented action against a drug producing country when it
suspended foreign aid to Bolivia in 1980.82 In the previous year of 1979, U.S. military
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and economic aid to Bolivia totaled nearly $64 million.83 The United States also
encouraged other countries around the world to deny foreign aid to the Garcia Meza
government, inspiring Garcia Meza to proclaim the existence of an “international
conspiracy to systematically blockade foreign credit badly needed by La Paz.”84 Despite
the U.S. and other countries withholding aid, the D.E.A. estimated that the Bolivian
government during Garcia Meza’s rule “netted more than $1.5 billion a year from
narcotics traffickers.”85 According to an American advisor to Bolivia’s narcotics police,
“100% of the Bolivian enforcement structure was corrupted” during the Garcia Meza
government. 86 The U.S. even canceled further drug control activities in Bolivia, citing a
lack of cooperation on the part of Garcia Meza’s government as the reason for the
cancellation.87
Garcia Meza proclaimed early on that his regime did not necessarily need the aid
of the United States, and had the support of its surrounding South American neighbors.88
However, the initial support Garcia Meza received from his Bolivian neighbors quickly
evaporated. $250 million in aid given to the Garcia Meza regime by the Argentine
Government was unaccounted for and “disappeared,” allegedly used by Garcia Meza to
curry the favor of regional military commanders in Bolivia. A road project in Bolivia
carried out by a Brazilian contractor was canceled when an overcharge by the Bolivian
government of $53 million was discovered. Patience from Garcia Meza’s Bolivian
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neighbors ran out, and continued to remain frayed even after Garcia Meza resigned. By
1982, during the “post Garcia Meza era,” Argentina refused to pay for natural gas
deliveries they received from Bolivia totaling $200 million, “citing unpaid loans dating
from the Garcia Meza regime.”89 The new Bolivian government, viewed as responsible
for the sins of a prior regime, was held accountable for the actions of an illegitimate
government, which affected the financial welfare of the country and its international
relations for years to come.
Internally, Bolivia was susceptible to the predations of the Garcia Meza regime as
well. Members of the Garcia Meza government used their positions of power to
mainstream and streamline cocaine trafficking corruption, and they utilized the Bolivian
state for personal gain and for laundering cocaine money. Imported luxury cars,
sweetheart land deals and sizeable kickbacks and overcharges from government projects
all filled the coffers of Garcia Meza and his close associates. Additionally, there were
allegations by U.S. officials that the Garcia Meza regime laundered millions of cocaine
dollars coming into Bolivia through the Bolivian military bank.90 The so-called “cocaine
coup” had truly wrought (albeit temporarily) a “narco-state,” a state system of
governance that normalized, rationalized and incorporated all of the accompanying
corruption, graft, and violence that attended cocaine trafficking operations into state
operations.
When democratically elected President Hernan Siles Zuazo took office in 1982,
Bolivia’s problems did not just go away. The U.S. gave Bolivia economic, military and
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drug enforcement aid totaling $230 million in the two years after Siles Zuazo took power,
but the economic aid did not alleviate or erase the problems inherited from the Garcia
Meza regime and the interim governments from the year after Garcia Meza’s resignation.
Siles Zuazo’s presidency had to deal with Bolivia’s “near bankruptcy, 1,000 percent
inflation, general strikes, food riots, drought, floods, three coup plots and [Zuazo’s]
kidnapping.”91 Siles Zuazo’s open commitment to combating cocaine trafficking with the
Bolivian judicial system and with drug enforcement police pleased the U.S., but
concerned American drug enforcement analysts because it threatened to spawn another
military cocaine coup.92 The military remained heavily involved in cocaine trafficking
during Siles Zuazo’s presidency. Furthermore, Siles Zuazo’s presidency struggled against
conditions that were a bit more subtle. When the Garcia Meza regime normalized
(whether tacitly or explicitly) the corruption of cocaine trafficking through their activities
as a narco-state, the regime also theoretically sanctioned and mainstreamed the increased
growth of coca by campesinos for the cocaine trade. Siles Zuazo’s renewed push for
enforcement against cocaine trafficking and coca growing attempted to erase or ignore
what the prior government established as “normal” amongst the coca growing
campesinos of Bolivia. Renewing Bolivian governmental resolve against coca put the
government in conflict with the coca growing trends up to 1982 and the people that grew
it. The Siles Zuazo presidency had more pressing concerns than just the coca growers
though. Runaway inflation and disastrous economic conditions in the early 1980s in
Bolivia created tense conditions throughout the country. Just as important as the
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disastrous Bolivian economy though were the devastating droughts and floods Bolivia
experienced from 1982 to 1985. The next section will deal exclusively with the drought
that affected western Bolivia.
2.2 Drought
The drought in western Bolivia beginning in 1982 and ending in the beginning of
1985 absolutely devastated the region, particularly in terms of livestock and agriculture.93
Considered the worst drought in Bolivia’s history, the drought affected the lives of 1.5
million subsistence farmers as of 1984.94 From 1982 to 1983, 75 percent of the total
agricultural output in Bolivia was either destroyed or severely damaged by drought,
floods, hail, or frost.95 Campesinos who relied on subsistence agriculture struggled to
survive as they faced malnutrition, starvation, and water shortages in the western
Bolivian countryside, most notably in the departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, and
Cochabamba.96 As of June 1983, some areas hit by drought had lacked running water for
as much as two months.97 The droughts and floods experienced by Bolivia and Peru were
caused by a shift in weather patterns due to El Nino. This El Nino weather shift changed
weather patterns so drastically that the traditionally bone dry Peruvian coastline was
drenched in water while areas that normally receive adequate rainfall like western Bolivia
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received none. This particular El Nino weather phenomenon became a global catastrophe,
wreaking havoc around the world and devastating many regions throughout South
America.98
Agricultural sectors in western Bolivia experienced almost total devastation due
to the drought. Crops died at such a high rate that western Bolivia experienced a “total
loss of crop germplasm, with some species [of crops being] unable to recover since the
devastation” (as of 2003). Approximately 60 percent of all animals (both domestic and
wild) dying during the drought due to improper water intake and inadequate grazing
lands.99 Germplasm loss resulted due to crop death and rural Bolivians eating their crop
seeds to survive during the extreme drought.100 Livestock that would have normally
provided labor for agricultural work was slaughtered by Bolivians for food.101
The majority of Bolivian drought victims were individuals who were the least
equipped financially to cope with the extreme circumstances caused by the drought.102 As
drought conditions continued to devastate the livelihoods of subsistence campesinos,
these same campesinos began to flood into Bolivian cities to seek work to pay for food
lacking in the countryside. The migration to cities compounded the problems associated
with drought even further.103 Less farming in the Bolivian countryside meant less food
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for people living in the cities, whose populations increased dramatically as a result of
rural migration to cities caused by the drought.
In addition to migrants flooding into cities seeking employment, the growth and
processing of coca increased dramatically during the drought years.104 Migrants flooding
into the Chapare and Yungas regions of Bolivia hoped to grow coca or process coca as a
pisadore, or coca stomper.105 Coca increasingly displaced the growth of other food crops
as drought ruined the crops of campesino farmers, which starved campesino families and
presented campesinos with fewer and fewer viable alternatives. Drought led to increases
in temporary jobs and alternative money flows stemming from the growth of coca for the
illicit cocaine market.106 As the subsistence campesinos were heavily impacted in western
Bolivia by catastrophic droughts, they moved into areas like the Chapare to grow and
process coca, as well as switching to growing primarily coca to earn money to survive.
This transition to an increased focus on coca growing throughout the region due to
drought conditions immediately preceded the Agroyungas Project starting in 1985. As
farming practices, frameworks, and realities changed to cope with extreme drought, coca
became a more dominant crop throughout the region. One of the only ways the
Agroyungas Project could succeed in their goals to substitute crops like coffee and citrus
for coca would be to alleviate campesino fears inspired by the severe drought considering
the switch in agricultural strategies that immediately preceded the project. However,
droughts and corruption were not the only conditions the Agroyungas Project needed to
consider in its attempts to crop substitute in the region. As the next section will
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demonstrate, if droughts and floods could have chosen the worst time to hit Bolivia, they
did so rather effectively by hammering a financially crippled Bolivia during the early
1980s.
2.3 Inflation
Initial inflation rates of 50 percent in Bolivia in 1981 reached levels of 200
percent by the time Siles Zuazo took office in 1982.107 The Bolivian government
defaulted on loan repayments for failing to pay its $2.5 billion foreign debt in September
of 1982.108 By 1985, the foreign debt had risen to $4.8 billion, with Bolivia printing
money that equaled “85 percent of its revenue needs.”109 Before the inflation crisis in
Bolivia, the total amount of credit destined for the public sector exceeded the total
amount of cash and quasi-cash in the economy.110 Simply put, Bolivia borrowed more
than they could possibly pay back based on the country’s balance sheet. Bolivia was
unable or incapable of managing their finances properly until the international banking
community forced them to in 1982.111 As unemployment rates during this period soared
to 20 percent, Siles Zuazo continued to remain reticent to act against devastating inflation
rates.112 Siles Zuazo preferred to introduce austerity measures slowly, allowing inflation
rates to creep ever upward, starting at 297 percent by the end of 1982, to 328 percent by
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1983, 2,800 percent by 1984, and 10,000 percent by 1985.113 Repeated national strikes
also impeded Siles Zuazo’s austerity plans from taking root.114 Bolivia’s economic
situation was so dire that in 1984, it considered withdrawing from the 1984 Summer
Olympics in Los Angeles due to the poor Bolivian economy and the government’s claims
to be unable to afford the trip for its athletes.115
By 1984, Bolivia paid $20 million to foreign printers to have their money printed
and shipped from abroad, with printed money becoming Bolivia’s “third largest import
after wheat and mining equipment.”116 The Bolivian peso during this time period was
relatively worthless, even in its highest denomination of 1,000 pesos. Routine
transactions often involved exchanges of a bundle of bills, and payments were frequently
weighed instead of counted. Allegedly, the only thing that kept the Bolivian economy
afloat during this period of extreme economic hardship was the influx of large amounts of
actual dollars from the U.S. which paid coca growers and processors, cocaine traffickers,
and bribed government officials to run the day to day operations of Bolivia’s
underground cocaine economy.117 Hyperinflation pushed narcotraffickers and coca
growers to utilize dollars as a way to provide required currency to conduct day to day
operations in a parallel informal economy.118 U.S. dollars also were favored over
Bolivian pesos in Bolivia, particularly because “people use[d] few checks and no credit
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cards,” which created extreme difficulties in everyday transactions due to the high
inflation rate, making excessive bundles of pesos for payment an absolute necessity.119
Bolivians lacked confidence in the Bolivian peso and the Bolivian state, and frequently
changed their Bolivian pesos into American dollars with “cambistas,” or the numerous
money street vendors, not only in an effort to protect their money, but to also ease the
purchase of “big-ticket purchases.”120 This economic trend further devalued the Bolivian
peso and led to a de-investment by Bolivians in the Bolivian economy and its local
official currency. Prices in Bolivia for common goods like eggs changed by thousands of
pesos a week, which caused a tremendous amount of economic instability in lives of
everyday Bolivians.121 The impulse for Bolivians to diversify their assets and investments
by “dollarizing their portfolios” carried over to coca growing. Campesinos have
traditionally used coca as a medium of exchange and as a method of accumulating riches.
Additionally, coca has traditionally been considered an asset of great liquidity in the
Bolivian campesino economy.122 As one campesino stated in the documentary Mama
Coca, “Coca is our bank.”123 Campesinos increased and diversified their investments in a
horrendous economy by increasing their coca growing. A 2.2 acre plot of land (just under
1 hectare) was capable of netting “up to $9,000 annually” from the production of coca,
while the second most valuable cash crop, citrus fruits, would only net $500 from a
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similar sized plot of land.124 Investing heavily in coca growing made economic sense to
the average campesino struggling in the tumultuous economy of Bolivia in the early
1980s, even if it did lead to excessive coca growing in regions like the Chapare.125
Inflation also had more subtle and insidious effects on the Bolivian economy as
well. Due to the rapid and explosive inflation rates of the Bolivian peso, people had little
incentive to work. In addition, merchants and peddlers failed to push their merchandise or
bargain with customers, because tomorrow’s price would always increase due to
inflation.126 A dual lack of incentive to work and to sell helped stall the Bolivian
economy even further during its steep economic downturn.
In the 1980s, Bolivia’s terrible economy also encouraged internal migration.
Indigenous Bolivians that migrated to Bolivian cities to work odd jobs as migrant
workers returned to their “already overcrowded” campesino family farms during the
economic downturn.127 These returning family members to the family farm most likely
worked growing crops like coca, or migrated into the Chapare to produce coca paste as a
pisadore, or coca stomper, or provided general labor for the production of cocaine sulfate
or cocaine hydrochloride.128 The Indian ayllu system often kept these Indian migrants
connected to the countryside when they worked in the city, and provided a place to fall
back to during hard times.129 The ease of working on the coca crop or as a pisadore
would have provided work for individuals returning to farms that were out of touch with
the day-to-day operations and work of the family farm.
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2.4 Paz Estenssoro’s Austerity Program
Victor Paz Estenssoro was elected to the Bolivian Presidency in the summer of
1985. Soon after entering office in 1985, Estenssoro enacted an austerity program to
correct Bolivia’s economic woes.130 Since it was impossible for the Bolivian state to take
on more foreign debt, the nation had to lower its fiscal deficit levels to zero or near zero
immediately. This could only be accomplished by freezing expenditures and increasing
revenues. Estenssoro’s plan to achieve these goals was simple in its steps. First, he placed
a freeze on public employee salaries and investments in the public sector. Second, he
wanted to reduce public sector employment by 10 percent overall. Third, he wanted to
dismantle various public enterprises. Fourth, Estenssoro felt that fuel prices should be
fixed at equal to or higher than their comparative international values. Fifth, he wanted to
devalue the Bolivian peso. Finally, Estenssoro wanted to implement a 5.5 percent tax on
fuels, specifically on gasoline.131 The actions Estenssoro wanted to take regarding fuels
impacted campesinos in two ways. Campesinos that relied on cheap fuel prices to have
their agricultural products driven to market became saddled with higher fuel costs and
therefore had lower profit margins. Estenssoro’s intended target was not poor rural
Bolivians though. Gasoline smugglers who took advantage of artificially low gasoline
prices in Bolivia (which as of 1982 stood at 10 cents per gallon) purchased the subsidized
gasoline and smuggled it across the border to neighboring Brazil, where they could sell
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the gasoline at a markup of twenty times the original purchase price.132 Gasoline had
traditionally been subsidized by the Bolivian government to aid their impoverished
citizens in terms of travel costs, energy costs, and the costs of shipping goods to markets.
Estenssoro wanted to eliminate this form of unintentional state-funded profiteering by
gasoline smugglers, and create at the same time a neoliberal state focused on privatizing
public enterprises.
While Paz Estenssoro’s austerity measures (or Decree 21060) focused primarily
on reforming the public sector, other job markets in Bolivia were affected inadvertently.
Decree 21060 lifted import duties on foreign goods. As a result, 42,000 factory workers
lost their jobs due to the inability of domestic products to compete with foreign goods.133
Economic austerity measures created scenarios of extreme and sudden joblessness for
many throughout Bolivia, angering the unemployed and pushing many jobless workers
into the coca regions in search of a job.
The powerful Bolivian labor unions would not take these economic restructuring
measures lying down though. The general national strikes under Siles Zuazo continued
with varying frequency and intensity as a reaction to Paz Estenssoro’s austerity
policies.134 Paz Estenssoro reacted by declaring multiple “states of siege,” dispersing
protesters with the Bolivian armed forces on various occasions.135 Over time, Paz
Estenssoro’s austerity plan stabilized the Bolivian economy and currency, and pushed the
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Bolivian economy further towards privatization. His efforts helped to re-monetize the
ailing Bolivian economy and pushed the nation to earn real money, eschewing the state
subsidization of Bolivians.136 At the same time though, his refusal to increase salaries in
the public sector and the lack of expansive monetary politics hurt employment and
economic growth in Bolivia.137 Tin mining was one industry in Bolivia that felt the full
brunt of Estenssoro’s austerity program, and its ripple effects would be felt throughout
the entire nation, including the coca sector of Bolivia.
2.5 Tin Mining and Austerity
Tin mining by the late 1970s and early 1980s had become an increasingly
unprofitable venture in Bolivia. As early as 1981, if not earlier, Comibol, the state-run
mining company operated at a loss. In the early 1980s, 70 percent of Bolivia’s industries
were under state control, and of that 70 percent, 70 percent of those industries were
mining companies. A Bolivian recession in the early 1980s was blamed on “a decline in
tin production between 1977 and 1980.”138 Tin and other metals such as zinc, tungsten,
and silver were integral to the Bolivian economy, so as their production slid, so did
Bolivia’s fortunes in the world economy. Declines in tin production in Bolivia were
blamed on outdated machinery and extraction methodology, as well as lesser quality ores
and the higher costs to extract these lesser quality ores. As Bolivia fell to fourth in world
tin output behind Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia by the early 1980s, state plans to
“eliminat[e] artificial prices and subsidies” of state controlled industries and aims to “end
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[the] benefits and privileges of Government officials” began to take shape.139 Following
the corruption of Garcia Meza and the inaction of Siles Zuazo against hyperinflation in
Bolivia, Paz Estenssoro glommed onto this reduction plan and incorporated it into his
austerity program. By 1986, the world’s tin market collapsed and Estenssoro laid off
approximately 30,000 Bolivian miners. Career tin miners were given one lump-sum
payment and were trucked out of the mining camps for good. Their constitutionally
guaranteed pensions were virtually ignored in the process.140 Many of these laid off
miners lived on mining property in company towns, so the layoffs and their eventual
evictions affected miners’ lives in multiple ways.141 Not only did they lose their jobs, but
they also lost their homes, their social networks, and their communities. Moreover, the
mining company stores, or pulperias, rationed food and supplies to miners in an attempt
to “starve them out,” and reduced supplies subsidies for miners’ children during the
economic crisis to one peso per child per month.142 These measures often pushed those
miners still employed in mining towns to the brink, and sometimes led miners to leave
the mines and go looking for work in places like the coca fields.

139

Ibid.
Warsh, “The Basket Case of Latin America.” The estimates of laid off miners
during this time in Bolivia is inexact. According to Shirley Christian in her article
“Bolivia Struggles With Its Tin Mines,” New York Times, Dec. 26, 1986, pg. A16, the
estimates of how many miners Paz Estenssoro wanted to reduce and how many were
actually reduced from the government payrolls depends on figuring out how many miners
were laid off, how many were induced to leave with payoffs, and how many simply left
their jobs fearing the uncertainty of layoffs, combined with those miners lucky enough to
retain their jobs.
141
“Hell To Pay; A Film About The Human Cost of Foreign Debt in Bolivia,”
Akwesasne Notes 21 (Summer 1989): pg. 7
142
Alexandra Anderson, Hell to Pay, VHS.
140

37

The Bolivian government under Paz Estenssoro told laid off miners to go to the
countryside and farm.143 The Estenssoro government effectively told unemployed miners
to work at a job they had never done before. This encouragement coupled with a lack of
shelter and community from being cast off of mining property successfully pushed exminers to go out and farm. Miners migrated internally to places like the Chapare region
and worked as coca farmers or pisadores.144 These unemployed former miners could
work either growing or processing coca, earning $30 for three nights’ work as a pisadore,
the equivalent of a month’s salary in the tin mines of Bolivia.145 This does not even take
into account the amount of internal migration into coca growing regions like the Chapare
or the Yungas by Bolivian people devastated by the terrible condition of the Bolivian
economy in the early 1980s. The austerity program’s attempts to stabilize the
hemorrhaging economy in Bolivia created unintended consequences, including an
increase in internal migration to coca growing regions by those seeking employment in
the coca and cocaine economy. This upswing in people working in the coca and cocaine
economy increased the sheer number of people whose personal investments would be
affected by future coca eradication and crop substitution programs in Bolivia.
2.6 Conclusion
In 1985, the Agroyungas Project stepped into this area of demographic,
environmental, political, economic and social upheaval with a plan to substitute coca for
other cash crops. The success or failure of the project hinged on whether or not the
UNDP took into account all the events that transpired before 1985 leading up to their
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arrival. Drought, economic disasters, monetary woes, state level corruption and public
employment adjustments all shaped the face of Bolivia in 1985. In a unique country like
Bolivia, formulaic solutions to perceived societal problems would not work. As Chapter
III will demonstrate, the UN, UNDP, and UNFDAC were unwilling or unable to
construct ad hoc solutions to the problems presented by crop substitution programs aimed
at reducing coca growing in Bolivia.
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CHAPTER 3
SETTING THE STAGE FOR AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT FAILURE:
PART III
3.1 NGOs
What are nongovernmental organizations (or NGOs), and how are they defined?
NGOs are one of the primary groups U.N. affiliated organizations use to conduct service
projects globally. According to the World Bank, NGOs are “private organizations that
pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the
environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development.”146
Recent scholarship in anthropology on NGOs might dispute these altruistic goals of the
NGO though. In James Ferguson’s “The Anti-Politics Machine”, the author relays how
the Thaba-Tseka project in Lesotho, which was designed to help the villagers, did
nothing, if not decline the quality of life in their villages. The true aim of this NGO
project seemed to be rather hidden and insidious, in providing the government of Lesotho
with more access and ability to be “a much stronger presence in the area than it had ever
been before.” This concept of “helping” provides a “point of entry for an intervention of
a very different character. The point of entry can best be described as either suffering or
poverty.” In this guise of neutral to benevolent intervention, the state can come in an area
to help without objection or suspicion. This schematic also “expand[s] and
depoliticize[s]” state intervention, thereby absolving the state of culpability from any
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feelings of resentment, anger or ill will by its citizenry.147 The NGO, as an independent
organization, (and by definition nongovernmental) allows the state to divest itself of
responsibility in the actions taken by the NGO, while the NGO simultaneously lies
outside of the direct control, scope and governance of the state (barring illegal activities
within the state). An NGO’s strength often lies in its ambiguity in relation to the state.
James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998) can help clarify the ramifications of an NGO
being situated outside of the state. An NGO’s peripheral status vis a vis the state conflicts
with Scott’s concept of legibility, which theorizes that the state attempts to rationalize and
organize all aspects of life and the environment in an effort to better control its citizenry.
An NGO’s lack of legibility therefore forces their operation efficacy to rely mainly on the
cooperative levels of the state and its citizenry, as well as the belief and trust of the
project’s target populations in the project’s plan, worthiness, and prospects for success.
Like Fernando Coronil’s argument regarding the state in The Magical State (1997), an
NGO (like the state) is only an effective entity if the affected people believe in its power,
its knowledge and its abilities, and is only as successful as those who invest and believe
in it permit.
3.2 Crack Cocaine in the U.S. and Coca in Bolivia
In the wake of the “crack epidemic” of the mid 1980s, as well as increasing
cocaine consumption in the United States and in Europe, law enforcement and
government officials looked at a multitude of methods to decrease cocaine usage in the
“developed” world. By 1985, crack cocaine, a cheap and easily smoked “new form of
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cocaine” burst its way onto the streets of America and fixated the minds of law
enforcement officials. At a time when chronic cocaine abusers in the United States were
estimated by experts to number five million Americans, any new form of cocaine that
was cheaper and fast-acting was seen by law enforcement officials and drug enforcement
agents as a nightmare scenario that could increase cocaine distribution, abuse, and
cocaine-related violent crime exponentially. Additionally, crack cocaine was viewed as a
more addictive form of cocaine, creating “crack fiends” that were willing to use up all
their money to smoke crack, “crack babies” who came out of the womb addicted to crack
because of their mother’s crack addiction, and was responsible for “uncontrollable
outrageous sexual activity, with women frequently exchanging sex for drugs when they
have run out of money.”148 Crack was alleged to have “a ready market in people reluctant
to intensify their intake by intravenous injection of cocaine because of the fear of AIDS”
transmission from contaminated needle-sharing.149 Worries abounded regarding the risk
crack cocaine posed to the safety of adolescents, who were considered at risk due to
crack’s affordability, “tendency to accelerate abuse,” portability, adolescent propensity to
overconsume, and crack’s ease of concealment.150 The extreme euphoria and high
supposedly delivered by crack cocaine made American rehabilitation clinicians, doctors,
and the American public believe that crack cocaine was not even directly comparable to
cocaine, leading crack to be classified as a drug in a league of its own.151 The high profile
deaths of celebrities such as John Belushi in 1982 and college basketball star (and Boston
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Celtics draft pick) Len Bias in 1986 from cocaine, as well as the attempted immolation
suicide of Richard Pryor in 1980 and Nancy Reagan’s omnipresent “Just Say No”
campaign starting in 1982 put cocaine abuse in the forefront of the American public’s
mind. Greatly reducing the seemingly endless flow of cocaine to a seemingly insatiable
American (and European) public became a top priority due to its increased availability
and affordability, as well as reflexively being desired by an increasingly addicted subset
of the Western world’s population.
While this seemingly insatiable demand for cocaine consumed the U.S. and
Europe during the 1980s, Bolivia maintained its role as the second leading producer of
coca leaf (behind Peru) for the production of cocaine hydrochloride. Producing coca leaf
was of paramount importance to impoverished Bolivians in a time of depressed tin and
silver prices, as well as waning prices and profits for natural gas in the 1980s; no
Bolivian export commodity matched the importance of the coca leaf.152
3.3 The UNDP and the UNFDAC
Into this backdrop of rampant cocaine abuse and lucrative coca growing stepped
the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) to propose an alternative
development crop substitution program in Bolivia to decrease the supply of coca leaf
processed into cocaine (or cocaine hydrochloride). $20.5 million was allotted by the
UNFDAC to construct a project for the Yungas region of Bolivia in an effort to further
the cause of “agricultural diversification and agro-industrial development.”153 While the
UNFDAC funded the project, the UNFDAC and the United Nations Development
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Program (or UNDP) worked closely together to conduct the project, with UNFDAC field
advisers assigned to UNDP field offices in Bolivia.154 The UNDP’s Office of Projects
Execution (OPE) was the main provider of coordination and execution of projects for the
UNFDAC, and this group, along with UNFDAC advisers and UNDP field offices in
conjunction with Bolivian national staff were the primary actors in this NGO U.N.
affiliated project.155 The UNDP’s OPE aided implementation of alternative development
activities in the Agroyungas Project and was a conduit of “communication and
coordination” between Bolivia and the U.N., as well as communication and coordination
between the U.N. system and the NGO activities on the ground in Bolivia.156 The
UNFDAC field advisers constructed the project and the UNDP and UNFDAC field staff
executed the plan.157 The UNFDAC funded the project and the UNDP managed it.158 The
Agroyungas Project was the largest project conducted by the UNDP and the UNFDAC
for the time period (the 1980s) in Latin America.159 UNDP, UNFDAC and related NGO
groups in places like Bolivia viewed their work as vital to structurally adjust and
“economic[ally] reactivat[e]” developing countries during a time in the mid 1980s when
“demands for their exports remained weak and [prices for legal] commodit[ies] prices
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were depressed.”160 This project objective, of course, did not apply to or take into
consideration the prices that illicit commodities such as coca and cocaine were
demanding in the 1980s. In essence, the UNDP and UNFDAC used a supply-side model
of crop substitution and alternative development in the hopes of choking the flow of
cocaine into the U.S., and assumed Bolivian peasants would then disengage from the
illicit coca economy. Supply-side attack strategies against coca were favored by
European factions of U.N. agencies, while eradication and repressive military activities
were favored by the U.S. government, with direct U.S. involvement in terms of military
personnel, training, equipment, and aid.161
The Agroyungas Project’s framework was based on a prior successful cropsubstitution project conducted by the UNFDAC in Northern Thailand in the early 1970s.
Referred to in official documents as a “crop-substitution formula,” the opium/poppy
growing “hill tribes of Northern Thailand” were shown how to effectively grow Arabica
coffee instead of opium, and were assisted by the UNFDAC in getting their new
agricultural product to market. In conjunction with the crop-substitution approach of the
program, the UNFDAC helped provide better medical and health care services, as well as
increased access to better education in the form of new schools. By combining these
initiatives together with government opium eradication, opium production in Thailand
went from 150 tons in the early part of the 1970s to between 20 and 45 tons by 1987.162
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This “formula” was utilized by the UNDP and UNFDAC when they constructed the
Agroyungas Project.
While it seems logical for the UNFDAC to construct a project that might mimic
the success of the Northern Thailand opium crop-substitution program of the 1970s, there
are some fundamental flaws to this type of generalized approach to solving problems.
One primary concern neglected by the Agroyungas Project’s adoption of UNFDAC
Northern Thailand opium crop-substitution strategies was geography. The highest point
in Thailand is the northern mountain peak of Doi Inthanon at 2576 m.163 The Yungas
region of Bolivia routinely averages between 1500 m. to 2000 m. (there are places in the
valley that are higher though) as a valley region hemmed in by forbidding slopes and
mountain ranges.164 Andean mountain ranges such as the Cordillera Real, which
routinely has 5000 m. to 6000 m. peaks separating the Yungas from La Paz, provide an
enormous obstacle to agricultural peasants in the Yungas wanting to get their agricultural
products to the closest regional markets of La Paz and Cochabamba.165 The problems
presented by Bolivia’s geography immediately surpass in seriousness the concerns
presented by getting agricultural goods out of Northern Thailand simply by topography
alone. The Agroyungas Project’s obstacles to success become more daunting when issues
of climate (such as heavy rainfall) and navigable rivers and roadways (there were very
few if any adequate trucking roadways in the area) are added to the list. The UNFDAC’s
generalized approach to the Agroyungas Project’s crop-substitution program was flawed
163
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from the start without considering ad hoc or very specific solutions to large, prolonged,
and localized Bolivian-based problems.
3.4 The Bolivian Reality
Bolivia has always been ranked among the poorest countries in the world. As of
1989 (near the conclusion of the Agroyungas Project), Bolivia was the second poorest
country in the Western Hemisphere, only surpassing Haiti. Bolivia possessed extremely
high infant mortality and “death rates from preventable diseases,” as well as an incredibly
low national life expectancy of 54 years.166 In 1998, official estimates after a period of
improvement in living conditions in Bolivia estimated that “70 percent of the country’s
population, or some 4 million people, live[d] in conditions of poverty.” Rural areas had
an even higher incidence of impoverished living, with an estimated 94 percent of rural
homes living in a state of poverty. This appalling state of rural life in Bolivia was in stark
contrast to the still high 51.1 percent of urban households as of 1998 living in poverty.
Despite showing improvement in living conditions over the previous 40 years (from
1998), Bolivia’s human development index (also dubbed the “human misery index”)
ranking of 113 out of 175 nations placed it in a comparable position with many of the
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.167
Not only did Bolivia’s people comprise an at-risk population, but the Bolivian
environment was at risk as well. Approximately “60 percent of the total territory
susceptible to erosion,” (which comprises 41 percent of the total land area of Bolivia)
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demonstrated marked increases in desertification because of deforestation related to
agriculture, urban expansion and mining as of 1998.168 A more subtle and nuanced
environmental concern was at play in Bolivia too. Coca crop eradication and monoculture
planting of crops like coffee, as recommended by the UNFDAC for the Agroyungas
Project threatened to destroy the wild plant ancestors of vital foodstuffs such as potatoes,
tomatoes, peppers, lima beans, and pepper. Monoculture planting in Bolivia could have
eliminated potential commercial food crops of the future like quinoa and wiped out a vast
wild repository of plant genes that could have assisted in protecting current food staples
from diseases, fungi, and viruses.169
There are environmental concerns specific to coca cultivation and coca paste
production as well. Erosion and soil exhaustion are legitimate concerns surrounding coca
farming in the Yungas. Coca often thrives in slopes of 30° or steeper to take advantage of
water drainage and gravity working in tandem with the heavy rainfall of the area. This
farming strategy contributes heavily to subsidence and erosion of the land. To compound
the problem, crop-substitution programs enacted in these particular environs are made
more difficult by the very peculiar and particular methodology needed to effectively grow
the coca bush in the Yungas. Coca-specific cultivation makes growing new types of crops
on former coca fields extremely difficult. Coca processing also exacts a toll on the
environment of Bolivia. Impromptu pits are dug to process coca leaf into cocaine paste or
pasta basica. These processing pits are typically located in proximity to waterways,
where necessary processing chemicals such as “kerosene, calcium carbonate, sulphuric

168

UNDP: Country Cooperation Frameworks and Related Matters, pp. 3-4
Amal Kumar Naj, “Plan To Eradicate Andean Coca Could Be Sheer Folly,”
Wall Street Journal, Jul. 13, 1990, pg. A9
169

48

acid, acetone, and potassium permanganate” are dumped into or nearby, contaminating
and poisoning local waterways.170 Coca cultivation and coca processing create impressive
and unique impediments to alternative development that crop-substitution programs need
to overcome to be successful.
The roadways of Bolivia were also extremely problematic and limiting for the
effective institution of a cash crop-substitution program like the Agroyungas Project in
the Yungas. The North Yungas Road, running from Coroico in the Yungas region to La
Paz was constructed by Paraguayan prisoners of war in the 1930s during the Chaco
War.171 Measuring an average of 3.2 m. across, the roadway either just barely or simply
did not permit two vehicles to pass each other at the same time.172 The road possessed no
guardrails and ran from an elevation of 4000 m. outside of La Paz to 1300 m. in Coroico
for a length of approximately 67 kilometers.173 This meant for the agriculturalists of the
Yungas that the drive to market for their agricultural goods was a 67 km. thrill ride uphill.
In 1995, the Inter-American Development Bank named the North Yungas Road
(nicknamed El Camino de la Muerte) the most dangerous road in the world.174 The road’s
dirt and gravel packed surface was often turned into a slick gooey mud by heavy rains,
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creating extremely hazardous driving conditions.175 Motorists routinely had to contend
with thin waterfalls, which could turn into raging torrents of water (depending on the
rainfall) that could wash out the roadway for hours, days, or months at a time.176 Hairpin
turns and sheer drops of thousands of meters were some additional road hazards that
motorists also had to manage.177 If an accident, death, or car failure occurred on this road,
no emergency services would attend to the problem and no mobile phone services
worked in these remote and high altitudes.178 Up until 2006, this road (which claimed the
lives of roughly 200-300 people per year)179 was the main artery out of the Yungas region
into a major economic market.180 Simply put, the majority of Bolivian roads during the
1980s, not just the North Yungas Road, were “rough, steep, winding, and narrow.”181
Finally, when it came to the roads in coca growing regions like the Yungas in Bolivia, the
coca growers and rural communities controlled the roads (and sometimes their upkeep),
not the state, the military, or the police.182
The way agricultural goods were brought to market was also an enormous hurdle
for alternative development strategies to successfully take root in Bolivia. Trucking in
Bolivia in the 1980s primarily (if not completely) consisted of goods being driven to
market in open-air trucks. Since the Yungas farmers lacked access to heated, refrigerated,
or even enclosed trucks for shipping their goods to market in La Paz and Cochabamba,
the open-air trucks utilized to transport agricultural goods to market would expose cash
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crops to the freezing temperatures of the high Andes before reaching their destination.
Fruit would typically be hardest hit by the exposure to freezing temperatures for
prolonged periods of time on its harrowing trip along the North Yungas Road to markets
in La Paz.183 Coca also had a distinct advantage over traditional agricultural goods when
it came to transportation concerns. Cocaine paste lab operators would go virtually doorto- door buying coca leaf from coca growers throughout Bolivia, and cocaine traffickers
would employ light aircraft to fly directly into regions of Bolivia for cocaine paste
pickups to transport back to Colombia (typically) for refinement into cocaine
hydrochloride.184 Cocaine paste manufacturers and cocaine traffickers possessed
pronounced collection and transportation advantages over traditional truck-based
agricultural product shipping. Large-scale truck-based shipping was a fairly impractical,
inefficient, uncompetitive, and dangerous method to transport cash crop agricultural
goods out of the Yungas due to the hazards of the roadways and the social conditions
surrounding them, as well as its relative inefficiency compared to coca leaf and cocaine
paste selling and shipping.
3.5 The UNDP’s Structural Flaws
The UNDP in combination with the UNFDAC oversaw the Agroyungas Project.
UNDP operations are based out of one of their “135 country offices” around the world,
involving national staff, which is of local origins based on wherever the project is
situated, and international staff, who are recruited for the project from outside of the
country. International staff members and consultants are paid based on the Noblemaire
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principle.185 The Noblemaire principle states that in order for United Nations programs to
recruit the best and highest paid civil servants in the world, United Nations programs are
allowed to pay recruited civil servants based on the “the Member State which has the
highest pay levels and which by its size and structure lends itself to a significant
comparison.”186 U.N. salary stipulations also dictate that there is a cost-of-living
adjustment and compensation plan for international staff and consultants on assignment
in U.N. programs where the cost-of-living disrupts the fairness of the Noblemaire
principle.187 The Noblemaire principle, however, does not take into account factors that
cannot be quantified for international staff or consultants seeking an assignment: quality
of life, standard of living, comfort, recruitability to a project, or desirability of the project
country. Bolivia in the 1980s was hardly a “plum assignment” for individuals with the
skills and expertise in agriculture, economics, geology, and transportation necessary to
effect fundamental change to the coca structure of the Yungas region.
Anti-corruption, anti-preferential and anti-nationalization measures put in place
by the UNDP also complicate projects conducted by the program, like the Agroyungas
Project. Senior management officials are always staffed by international staff, and the
staff “is rotated between country offices on a regular basis.”188 While the goals of this
staffing procedure are obvious and logical, the practice of rotating international staff in
senior management positions creates a situation that is anti-experiential. Any continuity,
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technical or regional experiential knowledge, staff familiarity, and working relationships
both intra-departmentally and between senior staff and its target project audience is lost
when the senior managers are rotated.
Another problem with the UNDP structure is a problem of the U.N. writ large.
Just like the U.N., the UNDP can only do as much (or as little) as its member states agree
upon.189 The UNDP cannot act like a rogue organization and conduct a project as it sees
fit, especially in a situation like the Agroyungas Project where it was funded by the
UNFDAC. No matter how righteous or just a certain action or plan might seem while
conducting a project, a certain amount of accord must be reached when conducting a
project between U.N. affiliated programs and amongst international staff executing the
program.
How a project is constructed also requires a certain level of accord and
cooperation among member states of the U.N. In the UNDP project cycle, there are five
self explanatory steps: “justifying a project,” “defining a project,” “initiating a project,”
“running a project,” and “closing a project.”190 While all of the steps require a certain
level of agreement among U.N. affiliated groups, member states, and within the UNDP
itself, a more important point to consider is the way projects always have a beginning, a
middle, and an end. Because the UNDP is a U.N. affiliated body whose function is to
“promot[e] [the] development and economic and social progress” of impoverished and
developing nations with the end goal being sustainability, there is little to no commitment
by the UNDP to extremely long-term projects.191 A project like the Agroyungas Project
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that attempted to promote crop-substitution strategies against a fundamental and
important crop like coca for Bolivians would have required an extremely long, broad
reaching and sustained commitment in Bolivia that an NGO like the UNDP would be
unwilling to pursue for the long term. For the Agroyungas Project to have sustainable
development after its conclusion, it would have needed to set up fundamental changes to
Bolivian infrastructure, native folkways and practices, agricultural methods, and
marketing strategy to promote and foster significant change to the coca culture of the
region and to Bolivia in general.
Finally, calls for the UNDP to reform its development programs compelled the
UNDP to establish “knowledge networks” and “regional cent[er]s” to provide access
globally to “development experts and local knowledge,” as well as “policy advice and
technical back stopping” to UNDP workers and those populations being provided with
aid.192 This type of knowledge network system is only possible following the global
communications boom spawned by improved telecommunications, cell phone technology
and the internet starting in the 1990s. Unfortunately, projects like the Agroyungas Project
were too early to reap the benefits of the global communications revolution.
The very nature of the U.N. and its affiliated programs, as well as the structure,
rules, guidelines, goals and restrictions of the UNDP have shaped the successes and
failures of the program and its projects. UNDP projects are often doomed to fail because
the UNDP fashions the program as a promoter of development without long-term
commitments, and attempts to be fair to all parties and member states involved,
inadvertently creating counterproductive rules and restrictions in the process.
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3.6 Conclusion
The institutional, cultural and natural obstacles blocking the road to success for
the alternative development program designed by the UNDP in the Agroyungas Project
were numerous, but not insurmountable. What was required of the UNDP for a modicum
of success was careful planning and consideration regarding what Bolivia as a nation
was, and what it was not, as well as remembering the program’s own internal flaws and
limitations. With cocaine abuse in the United States (particularly crack cocaine drug
abuse and drug-related violent crime) at the forefront of the American political agenda,
an alternative development program in Bolivia that steered Bolivian coca growers away
from coca growing was of acute interest and import to American (and European) law
enforcement and government officials. Just what were the goals though of the alternative
development plan mapped out for the Agroyungas Project? When the UNFDAC plan was
implemented jointly with the UNDP, what were the results of this highly touted
alternative development and crop-substitution program in Bolivia?
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CHAPTER 4
AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT FAILURE: THE MISTAKES OF
THE AGROYUNGAS PROJECT
4.1 Alternative Development
Alternative development as it pertains to crop substitution initially possessed two
guiding principles. One principle stated that crops existed that could be sold for illicit
market purposes. The second principle that guided alternative development dictated that
alternative crops could be grown on the same lands where a crop like coca was grown for
the illicit market.193 What was omitted by these initial guiding principles was the need to
put the farmer in equivalent or better economic circumstances than what the illicit crop
afforded them. These principles and the philosophy of alternative development have
themselves changed over time, due in part to the failures of the Agroyungas Project.
According to the UNDCP, these crop-substitution principles changed in the late
1980s, exactly when the Agroyungas Project took place in Bolivia. UN drug control
programs abandoned crop-substitution for income substitution, hoping to encourage
broader and more successful alternatives to illicit crop farming other than switching crops
such as coca to coffee. By encouraging farmers to better integrate into their national
marketplaces, and by carefully taking into consideration the importance of “local and
regional socio-economic factors,” the current UNDCP hopes to not duplicate the mistakes
of the past.194 These mistakes, missteps and oversimplifications occurred primarily in the
late 1980s during the Agroyungas Project, and the problems encountered and created by
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the UNFDAC, UNDP, and other affiliated UN organizations during the project
necessitated drastic policy change in UN-led drug control programs.
Also, programs associated with alternative development do not come without
their detractors. These detractors disagree fundamentally with the idea of alternative
development altogether. Many governments, particularly the ones of drug producing
countries believe that the growers of illicit crops often get rewarded for their illegal and
disruptive activities with a higher proportion of foreign aid and attention. This argument
against disproportionate resource allocation can also be viewed as a way for producer
countries’ “government[s] [to reduce their] financial participation in sustaining
[alternative development] action.”195 Critiques such as these have dogged alternative
development since its beginnings in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and continue to affect
views of alternative development successes and failures.
Despite these critiques, the Agroyungas Project did catalyze change in UN-led
drug control programs during its progression and after its conclusion, but not because of
its successes. Its importance stems from the project planners’ inflexibility, and their
inability to evolve and adapt their plans based on the complex local conditions of rural
Bolivia in the 1980s.
4.2 The Agroyungas Project
The Agroyungas Project was the largest project undertaken by the UNDP and
UNFDAC in Latin America as of 1985. With a budget of over $21 million, the project
was funded by the UNFDAC to promote agricultural diversification in the coca-growing
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region of the Yungas in Bolivia over a period of five years.196 UNFDAC officials felt that
the program should be modeled on the successful crop-substitution program that switched
opium growers to coffee growers in Northern Thailand. Using what the UNFDAC called
their “formula,” they hoped to replicate the successful opium reductions in Northern
Thailand from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, using primarily coffee as the crop
substitute in Bolivia.197 Their main goal consisted of “giv[ing] farmers a healthy income
from sources other than [coca].”198 From 1985 to early 1988, farmers in the Yungas
region received three million high-yield coffee seedlings to plant instead of coca.
Additionally, fifty three participating communities with approximately 10,000 residents
were given incentives such as the repair and construction of roads, better health care,
schools, and access to potable water, electrification, credit, and tools for joining the
project. By the beginning of 1988, three hundred of the one thousand communities in the
Yungas region “formally applied to participate in the program.”199 William N. Raiford,
consultant to the Agroyungas Project stated in 1987 that “these farmers, unlike those in
the Chapare, see a better future for their families.”200 While this optimistic statement by
Raiford (and tacit condemnation of the Chapare as a region of coca-growing for the
cocaine market) demonstrated a firm belief in the progress of the Agroyungas Project,
other project officials did not share such a rosy viewpoint of the work done up to that
point. Victor Toro, public relations officer for the Agroyungas Project proclaimed months
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after Raiford made his statement that, “We are raising the expectations of many people,
but we are really doing very little compared to what should and could be done.”201
Moreover, the amount of significant participation in the project was up for debate; while
fifty three communities participated in the project by the end of 1987 in the Yungas
region, bigger towns in the Yungas like Coroico had only a fraction (26) of its 200
villages participating in the Agroyungas Project.202 Official participation estimates also
appeared skewed in the favor of the project; by the project’s end, an estimated 8,450
people participated in 53 communities, representing a difference of 1,550 people from the
initial estimates.203
Participation in the Agroyungas Project was only one of many problems the
project had though. Project planners were unwilling or unable to understand the
importance of Bolivian history, ecology, geography, and peasant culture as it related to
executing the Agroyungas Project, and struggled to adapt to problems the project had
both within and beyond their control. As the next section will demonstrate, the
Agroyungas Project suffered from a lack of adaptability, a lack of knowledge, and a lack
of creativity.
4.3 Structural Problems
Commencement of the Agroyungas Project began in 1985. The reasons why the
Yungas region was chosen for crop-substitution are not documented, but critics
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speculated that the Yungas was a low-intensity conflict zone. As Lesley Gill highlights in
her work The School of the Americas, low-intensity targets in drug wars conducted in
Latin America are favored to reduce risk and loss of life, particularly in a war where two
sides are not competing in battle per se. The relative safety the Yungas could offer
compared to the volatile Chapare would be a welcome benefit to conducting cropsubstitution initiatives. Besides providing a low-intensity zone for UN-led programs to
operate, the Yungas was a recent player in the illicit coca for cocaine trade. Colombian
drug lords by 1985 and 1986 could not get enough coca leaf for the cocaine trade due to
the cocaine and crack cocaine boom, so they started to actively buy Yungas coca leaf, a
leaf which the Yungas area had sold for its pleasant taste to the traditional chewing
market since pre-Inca times.204 The Yungas provided an area of recent interest to the
cocaine trade, and did not have the history of militant coca growers involved in the
cocaine trade and U.S./Bolivian coca eradication operations that an area like the Chapare
did.
Problems with the Agroyungas Project started from the very beginning. Peasants
were given $2000 per hectare of coca that they eradicated, but the money and credit given
constituted a loan only. Part of the money was distributed in cash, and the rest of the loan
was disbursed to peasants in the form of tools and coffee seedlings (most often caturra
coffee) to substitute for campesino coca crops. The loan was doled out over the course of
a three year period, and campesinos who did not have a hectare of coca planted (a
majority of peasant coca growers in the Yungas) got correspondingly less loan money on
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a sliding scale. Campesinos were required to secure the loan with some form of land title.
If the loan was not repaid within a seven year term at an interest rate of 3-5 percent, the
land would be seized.205 This loan system not only would place a strain on the economic
futures of Bolivian peasants, but it was also not adequately explained to peasants that
they would first have to pull up their coca crops and sacrifice their coca income before
they received the loans and credit to plant coffee.206 Furthermore, farmers felt that “they
should only have been expected to make promises after the project had been functioning
for several years” and had displayed substantial results.207
Yet despite these problems between the project itself and its participants, internal
problems of the Agroyungas Project might have presented even bigger hurdles to overall
success. Accusations of a complete lack of Aymara language speakers assisting the
project plagued the project from its start to its conclusion.208 Project planners were
charged with lacking a single vision, rationale, or consensus, and seemingly relied on
what they could recall promising peasant participants. Therefore, planners presented
campesinos with different promises about the project depending on the planner, and
occasionally gave conflicting promises.209 Allegations of project planners and technicians
being involved in the cocaine trade also hampered the project’s credibility.210 The very
problem that inspired coca crop-substitution projects in the first place provided a means
for some project planners to gain enough wealth and social standing to be a part of the
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project. This hypocrisy jeopardized the project’s credibility with Bolivian campesinos
that grew coca. Campesinos might have known or could have heard who was involved in
narcotrafficking through their involvement in the coca trade as coca growers or
processors. Known narcotrafficking project members would delegitimize the Agroyungas
Project’s efforts in the minds of peasant coca growers.
Bolivian doubts about the motivations of the Agroyungas Project compounded
these types of problems even further. Potential campesino participants believed that crop
substitution was an international disguise or “code name” for coca eradication operations.
Campesinos had witnessed numerous foreign-led coca eradication operations in the early
1980s, and that trend continued with coca eradication plans such as “Operation Blast
Furnace,” which took place during the Agroyungas Project in 1986.211 As anthropologist
A.L. Spedding so eloquently stated in her work on the Yungas, campesinos felt that, “The
record use of coca to produce a prohibited drug has only provided secular grounds for
this continuing assault on indigenous values.”212 In addition, well known Bolivian
organizations such as Radio Yungas and the Bolivian NGO Qhana also expressed their
serious concerns regarding the motivations of the Agroyungas Project.213
Unease surrounding the project existed not only between planners and Bolivians,
but internally amongst project planners and technicians as well. Bolivian planners and
technicians received generous salaries by Bolivian standards, but their salaries paled in
comparison to the international consultants, managers and technicians brought in to work
on the project. Vast differences in salaries for performance of virtually the same work
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caused great internal friction between the Bolivian project members and the international
constituency.214 The Noblemaire Principle discussed in Chapter III takes into account and
attempts to create equivalent financial compensation amongst project staff from member
states, but does not adjust local project member salaries so as to be commensurate with
international compensation. The consequence of this dichotomy in the Agroyungas
Project could presumably have been frequent internal conflict between international
consultants and the local technicians, whose positions and prestige might have felt
lessened and subjugated due to their lower salaries. While all of these internal and
external structural problems of the Agroyungas Project posed great obstacles to the
overall success of the crop-substitution plan, an even bigger problem loomed large:
project planners did not fully understand the culture or the everyday realities of Bolivian
peasants.
4.4 Problems with Peasants
At the beginning of the Agroyungas Project, 80 percent of Yungas residents
“liv[ed] below the poverty line and another 15 percent were on the borderline.”215
Peasants farmed their fields and terraces with the same tools and implements they have
used in the area since the 18th century.216 When the Agroyungas Project came into the
region promoting crop-substitution, project planners experienced a sizeable backlash
from local peasants. Economic security and the culture of campesinos were both tied to
the very coca leaf targeted for substitution. Crop-substitution incited strong resistance and
vocal resentment from Bolivian peasants who felt their very existence was being attacked
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by foreign elements.217 Over and above that, this adversarial attitude held by campesinos
against the project was carried out even when they participated in crop-substitution
activities. Farmers consistently did not fully accept the new farming technologies
introduced by project planners. Equally detrimental to project success was campesino
refusal to use the fertilization techniques necessary to optimize the growth of substitute
crops like coffee.218
Perhaps this lack of cooperation from campesinos was not only a function of
resentment and suspicion, but the very nature of growing coca as well. Slash-and-burn
agriculture was the first step to growing coca, but coca was not the first crop planted on a
newly cleared piece of land. Maize was the first crop planted in a newly cleared field,
followed by rice. When the soil had been exhausted by these crops, coca was then planted
in the exhausted field, because coca was able to grow where nothing else could.219 Coca
provided four to five harvests spread out throughout the year, did not require a heavy
spraying of insecticide or heavy doses of fertilizer, and allowed campesinos to have a
steady revenue stream.220 Agroyungas Project planners failed to realize or ignored the
fact that peasants would not openly accept a substitute crop for coca that did not put them
in an equivalent or improved financial situation. If this obstacle was not enough, the
exhausted and weed-choked former coca fields offered by campesinos for project use
might never have been adequate farmland to grow substitute crops such as high-yield
coffee.221
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The Agroyungas Project also ignored or failed to realize that campesinos
possessed a unique social and cultural structure to their communities. As discussed in
Chapter I, the ayllu system governed the way campesino families led their lives in areas
like the Yungas. Families in an ayllu own multiple plots spread throughout a community,
as well as have access to common land shared by the whole community. Unfortunately
for campesinos, Bolivian state law did not recognize communal landholdings. Sindicatos,
or a collection of heads of households govern the ayllu; they oversee the community’s
land titles, adjudicate ayllu conflicts and disagreements, approve or deny exchanges of
land, and affirm or deny the cultivation of new crops.222 Sindicato support was integral to
carrying out the Agroyungas Project, but the project planners did not know it.
Agroyungas Project planners initially invited individuals to join the project, without
considering the importance of key individuals to successful recruitment. Planners had
received inaccurate information on how to recruit campesinos to the project. The
recruitment process also exacerbated community divides even further, with factions
divided between those who wanted to participate in the projected and those who did not.
These divides sometimes even led to violence, which encouraged ayllus and sindicatos
that were unsure about joining the Agroyungas Project to stay out of the project
entirely.223 By 1987, the Agroyungas Project attempted to correct this problem by only
recruiting groups “of at least twelve households.” Unfortunately for the project, ayllus
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usually consisted of between thirty to sixty households, rendering project planner strategy
still ineffective.224
In UNDCP literature, (the UNFDAC was renamed the UNDCP in the 1990s) the
organization continually stressed the importance of involving the community in the
Agroyungas Project. A project to develop Yungas health and socio-community
development stressed the importance of inspiring a “sense of social commitment by
encouraging [farmer] participation in community activities.”225 In another section, the
UNDCP stressed the hopes that the main crop-substitution program would stimulate
“social and community development in the Yungas.”226 The goals of these UNDCP
(UNFDAC) projects might have been noble, but they were impossible to achieve when
project planners did not know or bother to research what constituted a Bolivian
community.
4.5 Problems with Coffee
Agroyungas Project planners started out with introducing caturra coffee as the
primary agricultural crop-substitution product in the Yungas. Locals already grew a brand
of Arabica coffee called criollo coffee whose output was not high-yield, but whose
growing properties were tailored to the regional soils and climates and whose bean
quality was allegedly better than caturra coffee. Caturra coffee required high levels of
fertilizer, insecticide and good soils to thrive, all conditions which the Yungas region
lacked. Furthermore, caturra coffee needed a nursery at first, did not survive pruning,
needed to be replaced after becoming exhausted, and came to harvest at a time of year
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when labor was limited due to multiple crops coming to harvest.227 Crops such as coffee
have capital and labor input requirements that Bolivian campesinos could not meet.
Moreover, as works like Louis Perez Jr.’s Winds of Change have demonstrated, coffee
plants have a fairly long maturation process where no harvests occur. Replacing coca
with coffee put a huge and immediate financial strain on already impoverished and
struggling Bolivian campesinos, and expected them to accept penury in the hopes of a
better future from caturra coffee.
Unfortunately, these hopes did not end up bearing fruit. Loans of $2000 per
hectare of coca substituted were calculated from the profitability of the price of coffee in
the year 1985. Coffee prices fell by 60 percent from 1986 to 1990, (from $50/qq. in 1986
to $20/qq. in 1990) hampering participating campesinos financially and making them
unable to pay their loans back.228 For campesinos who were worried about an unproven
product’s prospects, their worst fears were realized. The ICO (or International Coffee
Organization) set export coffee prices. In 1989, the ICO set export prices at Bs. 75/qq. for
Bolivia. In an attempt to solidify their margins, ANDEC (or Asociacion Nacional de
Exportadores de Café) shrunk the amount of “legal” coffee purchasing export houses in
the Yungas to six depots, and fixed the purchase price of coffee from coffee producers in
Bolivia to Bs. 60/qq. Export houses in Bolivia created a situation where everyone in the
commodity chain won except for the coffee producer, i.e. the campesinos participating in
the Agroyungas Project.229
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Linking campesinos to the world’s coffee market was never a winning
proposition. The well-established Brazilian coffee market was a major determinant in the
world’s export prices. Plugging impoverished campesinos into a well-developed
commodities market with stable export networks predicated on speculation, climate,
soils, massive quantities of producer harvests and advanced farming technology would
never allow them to succeed.230 The soils being used for caturra coffee in the Yungas
were too poor, campesino agricultural techniques were too traditional and rooted too
deeply in their environmental realities, and campesinos were already enmeshed in a
reliable and financially beneficial crop: coca.
Other problems growing coffee in the Yungas existed beyond the market
problems coffee experienced. Between 1986 and 1987, an infestation of broca, or the
coffee borer beetle swept the Agroyungas Project’s participants’ coffee fields.231
Campesinos did not use the insecticides they were given as instructed, so this
compounded the crop devastation even further. Since the Yungas region had never seen
such a broca infestation before the project, project officials claimed that the outbreak
stemmed from a “lack of proper sanitary precautions when the new varieties [of coffee]
were brought in.”232 Campesinos suspected otherwise though, and blamed the project for
the new pest being introduced into the region, into a place it had never existed before.233
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To add to the infestation, a dry spell struck the Yungas at the tail-end of the
project from 1989 to 1991.234 This dry spell made the high-yield and high maintenance
caturra coffee even harder to grow for Yungas campesinos, and put them even further
behind in their ability to pay off their loan obligations to the Agroyungas Project.
Another important benefit to a crop such as coca was its drought resistant properties,
especially in regions like western Bolivia where rain could sometimes be
unpredictable.235 Near the end of the Agroyungas Project’s in 1990, admissions of flawed
tactics from project planners like Rene Navajas, executive director of the project, came to
light. In a radio debate, Navajas admitted that campesinos would have needed to cultivate
two times the land in coffee to have received equivalent profits to coca lands.236
Two and a half years after the project’s conclusion, campesino participants in the
project were still responsible for their loan debts despite the colossal failure of coffee
crop-substitution. Officials from the project and the Bolivian government explained that
those were the accepted and inherent risks of participating in a project that relied on the
risky world coffee market.237 These campesino participants had long been abandoned and
ignored before the project ended though. Bolivia passed a law in 1988 restructuring the
legality of coca, and effectively made the crop-substitution work conducted in the Yungas
region irrelevant.
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4.6 Ley 1008
Furthering the coca eradication policy of the United States, Bolivia passed the Ley
1008 bill on July 19, 1988. This bill, drafted with assistance from the U.S. Agency for
International Development, (USAID) committed Bolivia to eradication of coca in certain
regions. This same law treated coca grown in the Yungas area of Bolivia as “traditional,”
some areas as surplus “transitional zones,” and in other areas such as the Chapare as
“excessive,” effectively making a whole region of coca growing “lawbreakers.” Chapare
coca leaf was never favored by Bolivian coca chewers, yet coca’s increased role in the
Chapare over time was unmistakable; the Chapare’s coca growing contributions to
Bolivia’s overall coca production accounted for “one-half of 1 percent” in the 1930s, yet
by the beginning of the Agroyungas Project, the Chapare grew 90 to 95 percent of all of
Bolivia’s coca.238 Coca growing in the Chapare was mostly destined for the illicit
markets to produce cocaine. Ley 1008 did not outlaw coca chewing in Bolivia though,
since it was also established as protected by the Vienna Convention of 1988.239 Ley 1008
established 12,000 hectares as the allowable amount of coca growing in traditional zones
of Bolivia. Additionally, it set eradication goals per year in hectares (initially 5,000
hectares leading up to a goal of 8,000 hectares per year) and constructed a
“Comprehensive Plan for Alternative Development” (PIDYS).240 Alternative
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development conducted through this program would target only those people in the
traditional and transitional coca growing zones.241
By rezoning the coca growing regions of Bolivia and by offering conditional
alternative development, the Bolivian government (and USAID) undermined the cropsubstitution efforts conducted in the Yungas by the Agroyungas Project.242 The 12,000
hectare traditional zone cultivation limit for coca growing outlined in Ley 1008 actually
permitted expansion of coca cultivation in the Yungas. Aerial mapping by the
Agroyungas Project determined that 8,800 hectares of coca were cultivated in the Yungas
region.243 Expansion and reaffirmation of coca growing in the Yungas signaled the death
knell for earnest project activities in the area. The Agroyungas Project refocused their
efforts on the transitional zones of coca production, and created development centers
called Centros Mayachasitas in these zones to foster development. In the process, the
Yungas alternative development efforts were neglected, forgotten, ignored, and
eventually abandoned altogether, with project participants left to their own devices.
4.7 Los Centros Mayachasitas
Centros Mayachasitas were designed by Agroyungas Project planners to
“promote the training of farmers in agriculture, animal husbandry and agricultural
management, provide a starting point for agro-industrialization,” and provide a center for
micro-regional social integration, community, and development.244 These centers relied
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primarily on animal husbandry, promotion of livestock breeding, and the cultivation of
luxury foodstuffs for export.245 Crops such as passionfruit, citrus fruit, and prairie grasses
were promoted by the development centers, along with animal-based agriculture that
relied on animals like fish, cows, pigs, and bees.246 These crops and livestock had
inherent problems in Bolivia, just as caturra coffee had in the Yungas. Most of these
products had marketability problems in Bolivia. Either there was no domestic market for
the product (crops like passionfruit), or Bolivians could not afford them (cow’s milk,
pork).247 Besides the problems associated with no markets, products like pork and milk
experienced difficulties related to the lack of proper refrigeration facilities, the lack of
feed, and inbreeding of the small imported populations of animals.248 Despite these
considerable problems, there were advantages to alternative development based on
livestock and animals. Campesinos that were loaned livestock to develop animal
husbandry in the Yungas and transitional zones were lucky enough to be able to pay back
their loans with animal offspring.249 By enabling the campesinos to pay back loans with
animal offspring, participating campesinos avoided the pitfalls of loan default,
destitution, and penury that were associated with caturra coffee in the Yungas.
Unfortunately for all campesinos involved, there was not enough money in the project to
loan everyone livestock, and even if there was, there would still be the problems of
markets, feed, refrigeration, and inbreeding.
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One of the unintended consequences of the Centros Mayachasitas was its massive
draw of all Bolivians to seek opportunity and wages in the development zones.250
Alternative development targeting coca cultivators became sublimated in favor of overall
development for anyone willing to participate in the transitional coca zones, as outlined
by Ley 1008. Since the Agroyungas Project was designed for the coca-growing segment
of Bolivian society, and the Centros Mayachasitas were focused on micro-regional
development, there never would have been enough money allocated to this part of the
project to serve everyone that wanted to take part in the work promoted at Centros
Mayachasitas. The Agroyungas Project continued to overlook the impoverishment,
joblessness, and destitution that inflation and economic austerity measures by Victor Paz
Estenssoro created throughout Bolivia.
Not all aspects of the Agroyungas Project were underfunded though. A small
branch of the farmers association UNAPEGA in Ivirgarzama recommended that a dairy
factory be built in Ivirgarzama, a town in the Chapare. This Milka project plan was
incorporated into a UNDCP project funded by a Swedish religious foundation. When
UNDCP planners built the milk and cheese/dairy factory, it was constructed with a
productive capacity ten times the amount planned by UNAPEGA. Because of this large
productive capacity, this factory operated at a loss.251 Even if this was not the case, the
market for dairy products in the area was already fully supplied, and there were not
enough new dairy suppliers in the region to make the plant necessary.252 This serves as a
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perfect example of how the Agroyungas Project refused to take into account the
socioeconomic realities of Bolivia in the 1980s. Building a dairy factory of gargantuan
productive capacities might have been seen as a way to build in growth of the Bolivian
economy, but in reality, it jeopardized the factory’s existence entirely. On top of that, the
factory’s necessity was largely questioned. Operating at a huge loss made the dairy
factory risk future closure. Ignoring the recommendations of Bolivian farmers on how to
construct and run the factory in their country based on their own knowledge and
specifications led to disappointment and possible disaster for those very people the
Agroyungas Project were supposed to help. The project’s failure to listen to
recommendations was directly correlated to the project’s failure to understand the people
and the country they were trying to help.
Altruism was not always on the Agroyungas Project’s agenda though. Crops such
as soybeans had been projected to be competitive if grown in Bolivia according to
international market prices, but U.S. soybean grower lobbies nixed “technical and credit
assistance to Bolivian farmers to grow these crops” through their influence in U.S.
Congress. This unfortunate circumstance was not surprising though. The “form that
foreign investment and aid takes” is always “determined by the donors.”253 Although the
Agroyungas Project was executed and funded by NGOs, their actions were always
influenced to a certain extent by the politics and influence of those member states that
fund the NGOs.
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4.8 Infrastructure
In the Agroyungas Project, roads and electrification projects were often bundled
together with crop-substitution. When campesinos agreed to participate in the project,
some roadway and electrification efforts were made in their communities. Rural
sanitation, drinking water, general infrastructure and hospital projects were all separate
initiatives sponsored by various member states of the U.N. under the umbrella of the
Agroyungas Project.254 When project consultants such as William N. Raiford claimed
that 50 km of roadways had been built or repaired, those claims had hidden elements to
them.255 The parameters of what defined a roadway were often stretched to comport with
the slapdash UNDP efforts to build and repair roads in Bolivia. Road construction often
consisted of a bulldozer or backhoe clearing a pathway through the middle of a village,
sometimes even destroying villager property in the process.256 The National Road Service
of Bolivia worked in conjunction with the Agroyungas Project to clear and repair local
roads and pathways which frequently became obstructed by debris or fell into disrepair.
From 1987 to 1988, 40 miles of roads were “repaired or improved” by the Agroyungas
Project around the town of Coroico. Petty repairs to soccer fields and schools also took
place, along with construction of a reservoir in the town of Caranavi.257 Any extensive
road construction (or electrification) by the project might have raised serious concerns
with project planners whose primary directive was to lessen the amount of illicit coca
grown in the region. In a comparable alternative development project conducted by
USAID in the Chapare, officials were troubled to learn that a newly built road aided drug
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trafficker planes from entering and exiting the area. Accidentally aiding and abetting drug
traffickers’ flights in and out of Bolivia discouraged alternative development groups from
desperately needed and extensive road construction projects in Bolivia, including those
groups running the Agroyungas Project.258
Infrastructure was exactly what Bolivia desperately needed in the 1980s though.
In a country like Bolivia where there were few major airports and limited railroad
linkages between regions, roads were vital for campesino coca growers to get any product
they had for sale to market. Dangerous and inadequate roads such as the North Yungas
Road were the main arteries to transport goods and services in and out of the regions of
Bolivia. In an Andean city such as Lima, Peru, it was “cheaper to import a redwood tree
from California than to bring a log [into the city] from the Amazon.”259 Many analysts
would argue comparatively that Bolivian roadways during the 1980s and 1990s were
much worse than Peruvian roadways. A bus trip from La Paz to Cochabamba in 1988 was
a long and arduous ordeal due to the conditions and sheer lack of Bolivian roads.
Traveling along a main road, Bolivia Route 1, for a distance of 353 km, the direct bus trip
from La Paz to Cochabamba (with one stop lasting only thirty minutes) took eleven
hours.260 This trip averaged a pace of 33.6 kilometers per hour. Major infrastructure
improvements by alternative development programs could have transformed Bolivian
campesino life and Bolivia’s economy. Better roadways could have stimulated the
Bolivian economy, achieved greater interconnectivity between all the regions of Bolivia,
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and gradually might have shifted Bolivia’s coca growers toward the legal marketplace.
The Agroyungas Project was simply too hesitant to assist some drug traffickers in the
short-term and too impatient to build the infrastructure necessary to truly inspire
sustainable alternative development in rural Bolivia.
4.9 Conclusion
The coca, cocaine, and crack boom of 1984 and 1985 went bust in 1986, around
the same time the Agroyungas Project started its work in Bolivia. The project had nothing
to do with this price dip though; a surplus of finished cocaine created a glut in the world
cocaine market. Campesinos that received $350 per one hundred pounds of coca leaves in
1984 received $100 for the same amount in 1986, and by 1988, that price had plummeted
even further to approximately $20 per one hundred pounds.261 Colombian drug traffickers
no longer needed the “extra” coca leaf of the Yungas region. By the end of the 1990s,
Colombia no longer needed coca leaf from Bolivia or Peru much, if at all.262 Yungas coca
growers returned to freely growing coca for the traditional chewing market as permitted
by Ley 1008. The project’s target zone and namesake became even more irrelevant to
international crop-substitution aims, and the project gradually abandoned their efforts in
the Yungas to focus on other coca growing regions in Bolivia. At project’s end, the only
campesinos worse off in the Yungas were the ones that participated in the caturra coffee
program. They still owed their loan debts from participating in the Agroyungas Project.
261

Shirley Christian, “Bolivian Peasants Pin Hopes On Coca,” New York Times,
May 4, 1988, pg. A11
262
UNDCP, World Drug Report 2000 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 28-29. As of 1999, Colombia produced 68 percent of the world coca leaf
supplies, followed by Peru producing 24 percent and Bolivia producing 8 percent. Due to
crackdowns in small plane drug smuggling flights and coca leaf blights, Colombian drug
traffickers decided to supply themselves with the coca leaf necessary for cocaine
trafficking, thereby diminishing the roles of Bolivia and Peru.
77

Those campesinos that remained coca growers and stayed out of the project were
essentially rewarded by the passage of Ley 1008.
By the end of 1990 and 1991, most project terms for the Agroyungas Project had
expired. Some projects ended in 1992, or received extension periods into the years 1992
and 1993, but the UNFDAC had pulled out of the project by the middle of 1991.263
Following the UNFDAC withdrawal from the project, Bolivian project technicians
hastened a mass exodus from all project operations as well.264 Thus began the reabandonment of indigenous coca growing communities by the Bolivian state and the
Bolivian elite. Project planners and Bolivian elite alike considered the Agroyungas
Project a failure, and felt the best course of action was to disengage and disassociate from
the project (and coca growing campesinos) entirely.
They were correct that the project failed, but their theories on why the project
failed were severely flawed. Officials related to the project pointed to the inability to
properly commercialize Bolivian agricultural products and the failure to engage in the
world commodities markets, as well as the failure by Bolivia as a country to design
effective “export strategies” for alternative development crops.265 Yet, none of these
explanations were feasible without first establishing adequate road and agro-industrial
systems in Bolivia. In an area like the Chapare, transportation costs accounted for 80 to
85 percent of the value of agricultural products.266 Areas like the Yungas did not have
profit margins much better than the Chapare. Without the proper infrastructure to
transport goods out of the agricultural zones of Bolivia, crop-substitution programs
263

Drug Control Program 1985-1992, pp. 11-15; Leons and Sanabria, pg. 163
Leons and Sanabria, pg. 163
265
Ibid., pg. 165
266
Clawson and Lee, pg. 149
264

78

relying on world markets would never be profitable. Furthermore, Paz Estenssoro’s
austerity measures and Bolivia’s devastating inflation in the 1980s both eliminated the
possibility of Bolivia developing a viable domestic market for campesino “luxury”
agricultural products.
Something else must be considered in this “blame equation” though, and that is
coca itself. Coca’s reliability and profitability made it an indispensable crop for the
campesinos of Bolivia. Coca’s startup time was short; it provided campesinos with
multiple harvests per year, it was drought resistant, it was low maintenance, and it had
deep ritual and symbolic meaning to campesinos. The inherent characteristics of coca
made it an irresistible and lucrative crop, but so did its utility to drug traffickers. As one
journalist for the New York Times noted:
“The cartels often provide[d] agricultural credit. They pick[ed] up products at the
farm gate. They [paid] cash. And they circumvent[ed] the red tape [that]
surround[ed] legal exports.”267

Coca was just too good an investment for campesinos to reject. It was profitable and
allowed campesinos to avoid dealing with the Bolivian state. Any successful cropsubstitution project needed to take into account the reliability and significance of coca to
campesinos, particularly during a time of extreme poverty and joblessness stemming
from Paz Estenssoro’s austerity measures and conditions of severe monetary inflation.
Campesinos had no margin for error, and a crop-substitution project needed to introduce
crops that were equal to or better than a crop like coca. The sad reality for the
Agroyungas Project and for its peasant participants was that no such crop existed.
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That does not absolve the Agroyungas Project from its failures. By using an
unreliable plant like coffee as the keystone crop, planners destabilized the project from
nearly the beginning. Also, project planners failed to design ad hoc plans to suit the
unique project requirements of Bolivia and failed to evolve and adapt to problems as they
occurred. Towards the end of the project, planners “admitted that they entered the area
[the Yungas] totally ignorant of local conditions and that much of the project had failed as
a result.”268 Most importantly though, the major failure of the Agroyungas Project was
that it simply did not understand the Bolivian campesino or their ayllu community
system. Ayllus are a complex and integral community system in Bolivia that the
Agroyungas Project failed to understand.
Furthermore, from studying the history of Bolivia, any astute observer could
predict that a crop-substitution project would be viewed as a coca eradication project by
campesinos. Prior eradication activities throughout Bolivia made campesinos mistrustful
of any outside intervention into their lives. Suspicion surrounding crop-substitution
projects in the coca regions of Bolivia deteriorated the already tenuous relationship
campesinos had with the state. These coca reduction and eradication projects, along with
the neoliberal austerity policies of Paz Estenssoro inspired campesinos to organize into
the beginnings of the cocalero movement, which eventually swept the first
democratically-elected indigenous president, Evo Morales, into office in 2006. Resistance
and resentment against coca reduction policies helped spawn a grassroots political
movement in Bolivia.
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Perhaps, in a way, crop-substitution projects like the Agroyungas Project were a
good thing for Bolivia, because they created solidarity among indigenous coca growers
regarding coca. As Sanho Tree has stated, coca for the indigenous Bolivian could be
likened to what the buffalo meant for the Plains Indians of the United States in the 19th
century.269 As the United States settlers expanded westward, Americans realized one of
the best ways to eliminate the Plains Indians from the Midwest was to kill off the buffalo.
By killing off the buffalo, the United States killed the Plains Indians’ culture and way of
life, thereby eliminating them as a threat. Cocaleros organized themselves around the
cause of coca, negating the perceived threat against indigenous peoples that governments
and programs such as crop-substitution and coca eradication posed. Sadly though, the
polarization over coca might not have been necessary if the Agroyungas Project
understood the people they were dealing with. By wisely developing Bolivia with an ad
hoc plan tailored to the conditions of the region and by focusing on Bolivian
infrastructure, the Agroyungas Project might have been able to transform the face of a
third world coca-producing nation and better integrate it into the world economy.
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